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INTRODUCTION
Parties in international commercial arbitrations sometimes receive
rude surprises when it comes to claims for costs and attorneys' fees. In
some cases arbitral tribunals award the successful party a significant
amount, while in other cases tribunals award little or nothing. For ex-
ample, in Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. v. Egypt, an International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) panel awarded the
prevailing party $27.7 million in damages and $5 million for costs and
attorneys' fees.' By contrast, in Agip v. Congo, an ICSID panel ordered
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Thanks are due to Lara
Higgins and Donna Orzell for valuable research assistance.
1. See Southern Pac. Properties Ltd. v. Egypt, Award of May 20, 1992 (ICSID), re-
printed in 19 Y.B. COM. ARB. 51, 82-83 (1994); see also Maritime Int'l Nominees
Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, Final Award of Jan. 6, 1988 (ICSID), reprinted in 14
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the losing party to pay FF 22.8 million in damages, fees, and expenses,
but awarded the prevailing party no attorneys' fees.2 And in Vacuum
Salt Products Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, an ICSID panel ruled that, al-
though respondent prevailed on its claim that the tribunal lacked
jurisdiction, each party had to bear its expenses and attorneys' fees, as
well as an equal share of the fees and expenses of the tribunal.3 Thus,
even though these arbitrations were conducted under the auspices of the
same institution, the panel in Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. awarded
the prevailing party $5 million in costs and attorneys' fees, while the
panels in Agip and Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. awarded the prevailing
parties minimal costs and fees or none at all. These cases are not iso-
lated incidents; awards of costs and fees in international commercial
arbitration are often arbitrary and inconsistent.4
Today, arbitration is the method of choice for resolving disputes
between transnational contracting parties.5 But while its popularity has
increased, so too has the cost of this method of resolving disputes. 6 It is
not uncommon for such costs to run into the millions of dollars, some-
Y.B. COM. ARB. 82, 90 (1989) (awarding claimant $275,000 for fees and expenses incurred in
the arbitration).
2. See Agip v. Congo, 1 ICSID 306, 329 (1979).
3. See Vacuum Salt Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, Award of Feb. 1, 1994 (ICSID),
reprinted in 20 Y.B. COM. ARB. 11, 33 (1995); see also Final Award No. 7661 of 1995 (ICC),
reprinted in 22 YB. COM. ARB. 149, 163 (1997) (declining to award the prevailing party
legal costs and ordering the parties to bear equally the costs of the arbitration).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 92-120.
5. See L. Yves Fortier, International Arbitration on the Eve of the Millennium, I INT'L
ARB. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1997); Michael F. Hoellering, Managing International Commercial
Arbitration: The Institution's Role, 49 Disp. RESOL. J. 12, 12 (June 1994); Jane L. Volz &
Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing the Award Against the Recalcitrant
Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 867, 868 (1996). One of the main reasons that arbitration
is the preferred method for resolving international commercial disputes is that "it provides a
neutral forum where neither party will submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country
of the other party." John Kendall, The Role of the Expert/Adjudicator in Support of Arbitra-
tion in International Long-Term Contracts, 27 INT'L Bus. LAW. 201, 202 (1999). See
generally TIBOR V nRADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TPANSNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 23-27 (1998); Jose A. Cabranes, Arbitration and U.S. Courts:
Balancing Their Strengths, 70 N.Y ST. B.J. 22 (Mar./Apr. 1998); Richard H. Kreindler, Ar-
bitration or Litigation: ADR Issues in Transnational Disputes, 52 Dise. RESOL. J. 79 (Fall
1997).
6. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 248 (2d ed. 1991) (stating that "the cost of bringing or defending
a claim before an international arbitral tribunal is likely to be considerably higher than that
of bringing or defending the same claim before a court"); see also Andrew I. Okekeifere,
Commercial Arbitration as the Most Effective Dispute Resolution Method, 15 J. INT'L ARB.
81, 86-88 (1998) (noting that arbitration can be expensive because, unlike in court litigation,
the parties pay the fees of the arbitrators in addition to the fees of their professional lawyers).
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times even exceeding the amount in dispute.' As a result, parties now
recognize that an important part of the case is allocating the costs of the
proceeding itself and the costs incurred in presenting the case such as
attorneys' fees.8 Despite the significance of a claim for costs and fees,
international tribunals have no uniform approach for awarding them.
When arbitral tribunals consider a claim for costs and fees, they
generally consider three issues: (1) whether they have the authority to
award these costs and fees; (2) if so, how should they allocate them
between the parties; and (3) how much should they award. If the agree-
ment contains a provision addressing these questions, the tribunal will
abide by the terms of the agreement.9 In many instances, however, the
agreement does not address these issues or is ambiguous on how they
are to be decided. In these situations, tribunals have resolved claims for
costs and fees by applying the applicable substantive or procedural
7. See La Pine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp. (ICC Aug. 25, 1994), summarized in rele-
vant part in 10 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 5, at 7 (May 1995) (awarding $14.5 million in
arbitration costs and attorneys' fees); Southern Pac. Properties Ltd. v. Egypt, Award of May
20, 1992 (ICSID), reprinted in 19 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 51, 82-83 (1994) (awarding $5 million in
legal, audit, and arbitration costs); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc.,
No. 90-0169, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8046 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 1992) (confirming an award that
included $1.3 million in arbitration costs and attorneys' fees); Employers Ins. Wausau v.
Banco Seguros del Estado, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (confirming arbitral award
that included $930,730 in attorneys' fees and costs); Final Award No. 4975 (ICC 1998),
reprinted in 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. 122, 136-37 (1989) (ordering claimants to pay respondents
UK £500,000 for legal costs); see also Euroleader Shipping & Trading Corp. v. Stellar Lines,
S.A., SMA Award No. 3528 (May 7, 1999) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (awarding
charterer, inter alia, approximately $99,000 for overpaid hire and $329,000 for the fees and
costs of the arbitrators, witnesses and attorneys that it incurred in connection with the arbi-
tration); August Trading Ltd. v. The Fund for Democracy & Development, SMA Award No.
3471 (Aug. 17, 1998) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (awarding charterer, inter alia,
approximately $12,000 in damages and $205,000 in costs and attorneys' fees). Costs and
fees awarded in some domestic arbitrations also have been significant from a monetary
standpoint. See Arbitrators Award Lawyers for Texas, Mississippi, Florida $8.1 Billion in
Fees, 12 MEALEY'S LIT. REP.: TOBACCO 1 (Dec. 17, 1998) (stating that a "Tobacco Fee Arbi-
tration Panel awarded private attorneys for Florida, Mississippi and Texas more than $8.1
billion").
8. See Eric A. Schwartz, The ICC Arbitral Process, Part IV: The Costs of ICC Arbitra-
tion, 4 BULL. ICC INT'L CT. ARB. 8, 8-23 (1993) ("When an international commercial
dispute arises, the cost of resolving it may be as important to the parties as the merits of the
claims themselves."); Francis Gurry, Fees & Costs, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 227,
233 (1995) (stating that "the allocation of the costs of the arbitration and of the costs in-
curred by the parties in respect of the arbitration are very significant matters and important
elements in evaluating the overall price of the arbitration process").
9. See, e.g., Final Award of Nov. 17, 1994 (Ad Hoc), reprinted in 21 YB. CoM. ARB.
13, 38 (1996); Final Award No. 6320 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 20 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 62, 108-09
(1995); Final Award Nos. 7385 & 7402 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 18 YB. CoM. ARB. 68, 78-
79 (1993); Final Award No. 3572 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. 111, 121
(1989).
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law,'" the arbitral rules governing the dispute," or principles of fairness
and reasonableness.'
2
The lack of a uniform method for resolving claims for costs and fees
has resulted in similarly situated parties receiving vastly different
awards. This leads to unpredictability, making a case more difficult to
settle, and ultimately undermines the legitimacy of the arbitral process.
This Article examines the practice of awarding costs and fees in in-
ternational commercial arbitrations. Part I reviews the history of
awarding costs and fees and the approaches that countries have adopted
to resolve these claims. It concludes that an overwhelming number of
countries permit such awards and follow the principle that the losing
party should reimburse the prevailing party for expenses incurred in
connection with the arbitration, including attorneys' fees. Part II exam-
ines the approaches used by international arbitral tribunals in resolving
claims for costs and fees and finds that they are inadequate. Part Ill pro-
poses a new model for resolving these claims. The model provides that,
in evaluating claims for costs and fees, arbitrators should first look to
the parties' agreement. If the parties have agreed on rules regarding the
costs of the arbitration, either directly or by reference to arbitral rules,
the arbitrators should resolve the claim in accord with the agreement.
However, if the agreement fails to address the issue or is ambiguous on
how to resolve these claims, then the model gives the tribunal the power
to award costs and fees and sets forth the rules to follow. With respect to
the latter, the model states that costs and fees should be awarded on the
general principle that they should be borne by the unsuccessful party. It
also defines which costs and fees may be awarded. This model provides
10. See Triumph Tankers Ltd. v. Kerr McGee Refining Corp., Final Award No. 2642
(SMA Mar. 28, 1990), reprinted in 18 YB. COM. ARB. 112, 120 (1993); Final Award No.
6962 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 19 YB. CoM. ARB. 184, 193 (1994); Final Award 6962 (ICC
1992), reprinted in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AwARDs 1991-95 299, 308 (1997); Final
Award No. 6248 (ICC 1990), reprinted in 19 YB. COM. ARt. 124, 139-40 (1994); Final
Award No. 5946 (ICC 1990), reprinted in 16 YB. COM. ARB. 97, 118 (1991). A tribunal also
may award costs and fees based on general principles of law, see Award No. 9246 (Paris
Chamber of Arb. Mar. 8, 1996), reprinted in 22 YB. COM. AB. 28, 34 (1997) (choosing lex
mercatoria as the applicable law and awarding claimant FF 50,000 for costs and fees), but
this option appears to have been used less frequently.
11. See Awards of Aug. 18, 1994 & Nov. 8, 1994 (Ad Hoc), reprinted in 21 YB. CoM.
ARB. 40, 45-6 (1996) (applying the arbitration rules of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe and ruling that the costs of arbitration shall be borne equally by both
parties and that each shall bear its own legal expenses); Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana
(Ad Hoc Oct. 27, 1989), reprinted in 19 YB. COM. ARB. 11, 30-32 (1994) (applying
UNCITRAL Rules Article 38 and ordering respondent to pay $84,781.14 for fees and costs).
12. See Final Award No. 6197 (ICC 1995), reprinted in 23 YB. CoM. ARB. 13, 29
(1998); Final Award No. 6752 (ICC 1991), reprinted in 18 YB. COM. MaR. 54, 57 (1993);
Final Award No. 3267 (ICC 1984), reprinted in 12 YB. COM. ARB. 87, 96 (1987).
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a simple and straight forward approach for tribunals to use in resolving
claims for costs and fees and thus can bring much needed uniformity to
the area.
I. OVERVIEW OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Background
The practice of allocating costs and attorneys' fees between the par-
ties to a dispute can be traced to Roman law, where the practice of
requiring the losing party to pay the winning party's costs developed.'3
Today, this practice is known as the principle that costs follow the event
or the English rule.
4
There are several policies that support the principle that costs follow
the event. These policies include (1) punishing the losing party, (2) in-
demnifying the winning party, and (3) deterring frivolous and bad faith
litigation.
Some commentators have speculated that the principle of costs fol-
low the event was originally penal in nature. They argue that courts
awarded costs and fees in order to punish an unsuccessful plaintiff for
bringing a false claim or to fine a losing defendant for unjustly refusing
the plaintiff's rights."
While the rationale for the practice of allocating costs and fees may
originally have been to penalize the losing party, today the main reason
13. Interestingly, in early ecclesiastical courts there were no fees for legal advice. How-
ever, under legis actio sacramentum, litigating parties deposited a sum of money in court to
ensure legal proceedings were initiated with good cause. At the conclusion of the action, the
deposit was refunded to the prevailing party, but the deposit of the losing party was forfeited
to the temple. In addition, where a defendant had denied the plaintiff's claims in bad faith,
courts customarily doubled the amount of the judgment. During the Byzantine Empire, law-
yers and judicial officials began charging fees for their services and courts started requiring
the losing party to pay the costs of the prevailing party in cases involving frivolous litigation
or bad faith. In 486 A.D., East Roman Emperor Zenon first announced the rule that the mere
fact of losing was sufficient ground to impose an obligation upon the loser to pay the win-
ner's costs. For a historical background on the practice of awarding costs and fees, see
Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 37, 40-44 (1984); Arthur Engelmann, The Roman Procedure, in A HISTORY OF
CONTINENTAL CvitL PROCEDURE 239, 279-82 (Robert Wyness Millar ed. & trans., 1927).
14. In England, the rules on the awarding of costs and fees developed in law through
piecemeal legislation and in equity through the exercise of the chancellor's discretion. See
Pfennigstorf, supra note 13, at 42; see also ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE ABROAD § 9.9.3
(Henk J. Snijders ed., 1996).
15. See J. Gillis Wetter & Charl Priem, Costs and Their Allocation in International
Commercial Arbitrations, 2 AM. REv. ITr'L ARa. 249, 329 (1991); see also Graham J. Gra-
ham-Green, Taxation of Costs in the Supreme Court, 49 AirB. 319 (1984).
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for doing so is to indemnify the winning party.16 Dr. J. Gillis Wetter and
Charl Priem explained that the modem justification for the principle that
costs follow the event
is founded on the concept that if and to the extent that a claim-
ant is entitled in law and justice to obtain a sum of money from
another party, [a claimant] should not have to suffer any ex-
pense (beyond the cost of addressing a simple demand) for
being awarded it; conversely, if a respondent is exposed to a
claim which at the end of the day is deemed not to be founded
in law and justice, [a respondent] should not suffer any expense
for defending the action.'7
It also has been asserted that the principle that costs follow the event
advances the goal of deterring claims with little merit and bad faith liti-
gation.' 8 This is based on the premise that a claimant, knowing that it
must bear both its own costs and those of the other party should it lose,
will not pursue low quality claims or institute a vexatious action. Simi-
larly, the principle of costs follow the event discourages parties from
exaggerating their claims and counterclaims.19
B. Costs Follow the Event
Most jurisdictions allocate costs and fees in litigation according to
the principle that costs follow the event.20 This principle is typically set
forth in statutes, such as the French New Code of Civil Procedure which
states that "costs are assessed against the losing party unless the judge
assesses the whole or a part of the burden against the other party, in a
decision with reason given."2' In other countries, such as Australia and
16. See Thomas D. Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Over-
view, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653-54.
17. Wetter & Priem, supra note 15, at 330. Pursuant to this rationale, some countries
hold the unsuccessful party strictly liable for the loss, while others require the losing party to
pay only if it was in some way at fault. See Rowe, supra note 16, at 658.
18. See Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allo-
cation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. EcON. 557 (1986); David Rosenberg & Steven
Shavell, A Model In Which Suits Are Brought For Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 3 (1985).
19. See Wetter & Priem, supra note 15, at 332.
20. Countries that follow the principle that costs follow the event include, among others,
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Iran, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, Turkey, and Yemen. See JOHN
Y GOTANDA, SUPPLEMENTAL DAMAGES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 146-73 (1998)
(containing a survey of national laws on the awarding of costs and fees).
21. NEw CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, art. 696, at 143 (Francoise Grivart de
kerstrat & William E. Crawford trans., 1978); see C6DIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] (Braz.)
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Canada, courts have broad discretion to determine whether to award
costs and fees to the successful party, but typically do so under the prin-
ciple that costs follow the event."
With respect to allocating costs or fees, or both, the practice in some
countries is simply to award all allowable costs and fees to the prevail-
24ing party.23 Others allocate them in proportion to a party's success.
When a prevailing party's success is total, the costs or fees, or both, are
borne completely by the unsuccessful party. However, when a party's
success is less than total, their reimbursement claim is offset by the pro-
21portion of unsuccessful claims.
The costs and fees that may be recovered by the prevailing party are
26generally those that were reasonable and necessary for the litigation.
They typically include filing fees, witness fees, transportation expenses,
and attorneys' fees.27
art. 20 (requiring the losing party to pay the winner's fees and costs in court proceedings in
Brazil); Zivilprozellordnung [ZPO] § 91(1) (F.R.G.), translated in SIMON L. GOREN, THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY OF JANUARY 30,
1877 AND THE INTRODUCTORY ACT FOR THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF JANUARY
30, 1877 AS OF JANUARY 1988 (1990) (stating that the "failing party shall bear the costs of
the lawsuit"); Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure ch. 18, § 8, translated in THE SWEDISH
CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 73 (Anders Bruzelius & Krister Thelin eds., rev. ed. 1979)
(1968) (awarding the winning party all costs "reasonably incurred" during the proceeding);
C6D.COM. art. 1084 (Mex.) (providing that costs shall always be imposed against the losing
party and against a party that does not submit sufficient proof to support a claim).
22. See Cie Price Lt6e v. Deniso Lebel Inc. [1996] R.J.Q. 2085 (C.A.) (Que.); Hospital-
ity Corp. of Manitoba Inc. v. North Am. Bldg. Ltd. [1994] 70 W.A.C. 292, 95 Man. R. (2d)
292 (C.A.) (Man.); Vipond v. Sisco [1913] 14 D.L.R. 129 (Ont. S.C.); Ritter v. Godfrey
(1919) 2 K.B. 47; Donald Campell & Co. v. Pollak (1927) A.C. 732; Morosi v. Mirror News-
papers Ltd. (1977) 2 N.S.W.R. 749; E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd. (1982)
3 W.L.R. 245.
23. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 21 (noting that in England the general rule is that all
allowable costs shall be borne by the unsuccessful party).
24. See id. (stating that Germany, Switzerland and Austria allocate costs in proportion to
the outcome of the case); Wetter & Priem, supra note 15, at 274 (explaining that Sweden
allocates costs "inter partes on a sliding scale proportionate to the assessment by the court of
the claims made by the parties").
25. Wolfgang Hahnkamper, Austria (Dec. 1997), in 1 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE AUS-107 (Richard H. Kreindler gen. ed. & Judith L. Holdsworth,
assistant ed., 1997) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION]; Ludmilla NeustupnA, Czech
Republic (Dec. 1997), in 1 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION CZK-88.
26. See ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPO] § 9 1(1) (F.R.G.) ( stating that recoverable costs must
be "necessary for purposeful prosecution or the defense of [the successful party's] rights");
Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 21, at ch. 18, § 8 (allowing recovery of all
costs "reasonably incurred" in the proceedings); BERNARD C. CAIRNS, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL
PROCEDURE 490-91 (3rd ed. 1992) (stating costs and fees must be reasonable and necessary
to the litigation).
27. See Henk J. Snijders ed., supra note 14, at § 5.9.3 (noting that in England the losing
party is typically responsible for the successful party's costs, including the solicitor's dis-
bursement fees, the barrister's fees, the expenses of the witnesses, the experts' fees and other
Fall 1999]
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In many countries, however, awards of costs and fees are subject to
a variety of limitations. For example, in Spain, costs that may be recov-
ered by a successful party are limited to one-third of the amount claimed
in the action." In addition, in England, Germany, and Switzerland, the
amount of attorneys' fees is determined by a fixed fee schedule, which
may not reflect the actual fees incurred." In some countries, courts may
refuse to award costs or fees, or both, if the winning party acted in bad
faith in the litigation.30
Most countries also apply the principle that costs follow the event in
arbitrations." For example, arbitration laws in England and Mexico
specifically state that the arbitral tribunal shall award the costs of the
arbitration on the general principle that costs follow the event.32 In
court expenses); Ernest Arendt & Thda Harles-Walch, Luxembourg (Sept. 1994), in 3 INTER-
NATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14-15 (Pieter Sanders & Albert Jan
Van Den Berg eds., 1998) (noting that in Luxembourg the losing litigant is generally ordered
to pay all court fees and attorneys' fees involving necessary steps taken during proceedings,
but not the attorneys' retainer for representation) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK];
see also STEPHEN O'MALLEY & ALEXANDER LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE § 50.7
(1989).
28. See FERNANDO PoMtBo, DOING BUSINESS IN SPAIN § 23.01[5][iv] (1996).
29. See O'MALLEY & LAYTON, supra note 27, at § 56.57 (stating that in England the
successful party will rarely recovery all of its litigation costs because of cost regulations and
fee scales); Henk J. Snijders ed., supra note 14, at § 9.9.3 (noting that in Germany there are
detailed rules governing the amount of court fees, the costs of legal proceedings, and attor-
neys' fees); INTRODUCTION TO SWxss LAW 275 (F. Dessemontet & T. Ansay eds., 1995)
(stating that in Switzerland the amount of court and party costs are determined by fixed
schedule); see also NEw CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, supra note 21, at 143
(noting that costs awarded in France include "[a vocats' fees insofar as they are regulated");
ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE ABROAD, supra note 14, § 8.9.3 (noting that in the Netherlands
the winning party will never recover the actual costs of the litigation because costs are based
on certain standard amounts for certain standard activities and the amount of the claim and
that "costs for legal representation are awarded on the basis of fixed amounts which usually
do not cover the real costs").
30. See ELENA MERINO-BLANCO, THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM 155 (1996) (noting that
in Spain "[if] the judge makes a finding of bad faith ... all costs shall be borne by the party
litigating in bad faith"); Wetter & Priem, supra note 15, at 271 (stating that in Sweden ex-
penses are not recoverable where a party shows bad faith); NEw CODE OF CIvn. PROCEDURE
IN FRANCE, supra note 21, at 143 (providing that in France "[c]osts are assessed against the
losing party unless the judge assesses the whole or a part of the burden against the other
party, in a decision with reasons given").
31. See GOTANDA, supra note 20, at 153-73 (surveying national laws on the awarding of
costs and fees in arbitrations).
32. See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 61(2) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 71 (4th ed. 1996) (providing that in the absence of a contrary agree-
ment, "the tribunal shall award costs on the general principle that costs should follow the
event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the circumstances this is not appropriate
in relation to the whole or part of the costs"); C6D.CoM. art. 1454 (Mex.) (stating that, sub-
ject to exceptions, the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the losing party).
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Australia, Israel, and Turkey, arbitrators are given the power to allocate
costs and fees and customarily award them against the losing party.33
In arbitration, costs and fees fall into two general categories: (1) the
costs of the proceedings, and (2) the costs of the parties. The costs of the
proceedings include the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal34 and
the administrative fees of the administering authority.3" The costs of the
parties are the legal costs of the claimant and respondent, which include
(a) attorneys' fees, (b) various professional services fees such as those of
technical advisors or experts, (c) the fees and expenses of witnesses, and
(d) incidental expenses such as secretarial fees and telephone, facsimile,
and copying charges.36
Many countries, such as Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden, do
not distinguish between the two types of costs and simply allow the ar-
bitral tribunal to award both to the prevailing party.37 However, in some
33. See Michael C. Pryles, Australia (Sept. 1992), in 1 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, su-
pra note 27, at 22-23; Smadar Ottolenghi, Israel (Aug. 1984), in 2 INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 18-19; Rabi Koral, Turkey (June 1989), in 4 INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 25; see also Zhivko Stalev, Bulgaria (Aug. 1995), in 1 INTER-
NATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 18 (stating that in Bulgaria arbitrators apportion
arbitral costs "according to the event"); Gustaf M6iler, Finland (Oct. 1995), in 2 INTERNA-
TIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 21-22 (noting that Finland's Arbitration Act together
with customary practice dictate that the losing party pay the costs of the arbitration, includ-
ing legal representation); Albert Jan Van den Berg, The Netherlands (Apr. 1987), in 3
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 25-26 (noting that in the Netherlands the los-
ing party bears the costs of the arbitration); Fernando Cruz & Ddrio Moura Vicente, Portugal
(Jan. 1991), in 3 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 13 (noting that arbitrators in
Portugal award costs and attorneys' fees in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides that the losing party bears the costs); Robert Briner, Switzerland (Sept.
1992), in 3 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 28-29 (providing that in Switzer-
land the losing party generally pays the costs and fees of the winning party in arbitration).
34. The fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal include the fees and expenses of the
members of the arbitral tribunal, translators, interpreters and secretaries. They also include
fees and costs of experts retained by the tribunal. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 6, at
406-07.
35. Administrative fees typically consist of the filing and service fees of the adminis-
tering agency. See Steven J. Stein & Daniel R. Wotman, International Commercial
Arbitration in the 1980's: A Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems & Rules, 38 Bus.
LAW. 1685, 1722 (1983).
36. See W. LAWRE&CE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBI-
TRATION 40 (2d ed. 1990).
37. See Werner Melis, Austria (June 1989), in I INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note
27, at 12 (noting that in Austria the losing party is generally required to pay reasonable costs
of legal representation); Van den Berg, supra note 33, at 25-26 (providing that in the Neth-
erlands awards commonly require the losing party to pay for the legal assistance of the
prevailing party); Ulf Holmback & Nils Mangard, Sweden (June 1989), in 3 INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 17 (noting that in Sweden attorneys' fees are part of the final
award, recoverable by a successful, non-negligent party); see also O'MALLEY & LAYTON,
supra note 27, at § 49.57 (stating that in Denmark the "losing party is normally ordered to
pay ... a proportion of the costs which a party has to pay to his advokat"); M61ler, supra
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countries, such as Belgium and Greece, arbitrators may award the costs
of the proceedings to prevailing parties, but are prohibited from award-
ing legal costs, except in special circumstances.38
C. The American Rule
Unlike most countries, the United States does not apply the princi-
ple that costs follow the event. Instead, the parties in litigation must
generally bear their own expenses, including attorneys' fees. 39 This
practice has become known as the American rule.4°
note 33, at 22 (noting that Finland's common practice in arbitrations is for the losing party to
pay the winning party's costs of legal representation); The Arbitration and Conciliation Or-
dinance, 1996 § 31(8) (Ind.) (stating that India authorizes arbitrators to allocate attorneys'
fees along with other costs in the award, unless the parties have already allocated them in
their agreement); Briner, supra note 33, at 29 (stating that Swiss Procedural rules generally
grant the costs of legal assistance to the winning party).
38. See Lambert Matray, Belgium (Oct. 1995), in 1 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra
note 27, at 27 (noting that in Belgium awards of attorneys' fees are forbidden on the grounds
that they violate public policy); Anghdlos C. Foustoucos, Greece (Nov. 1985), in 2 INTER-
NATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 21 (noting that in Greece it is not customary for an
arbitral award to include attorneys' fees, although arbitrators have the power to award them);
see also Sudargo Gautama, Indonesia (Feb. 1998), in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra
note 27, at 23 (noting that in arbitrations in Indonesia, the winning party is not awarded its
attorneys' fees); Law on Commercial Arbitration, art. 31(2) (Ukraine) (providing that arbi-
trators in Ukraine generally are reluctant to award attorneys' fees, except where justifiable or
where a party has acted inappropriately or caused a delay in proceedings).
39. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). For a dis-
cussion of attorneys' fees in the United States, see ROBERT L. RossI, ATTORNEYS' FEES (2nd
ed. 1995 & Supp. 1999); 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2675 (3rd ed. 1998). In addition to the United States, the practice in Japan is for the
parties to bear their own expenses, including attorneys' fees. There is an exception in tort
cases, in which a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorneys' fees and expenses as additional
damage. See Masatami Otsuka, Japan, in 2 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 25, at
JAP-44.
40. The history of the American rule is somewhat unclear. Professor John Leubsdorf ar-
gues that the American rule evolved because of the collapse of attorney fee regulation in the
first half of the nineteenth century. John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule
on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984). He notes that, in the colo-
nial period, statutes regulated lawyers' fees and provided for the prevailing party to recover
costs and fees. Id. at 10. However, after the American Revolution, lawyers were liberated
from government control and were able to charge clients with a large degree of discretion.
Id. at 13. Professor Leubsdorf states that "[olnce these limits were evaded or repealed, the
American rule became institutionalized because attorneys no longer had to push to recover
their fees from the defeated party." Id. Another theory, set forth by Professors Ronald
Braeutigam, Bruce Owen, and John Panzar, posits that the American rule may have been
adopted to reduce lawyer fees. See Ronald Braeutigam, et al., An Economic Analysis of Al-
ternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1984). They explain:
[Llawyers in colonial American were regarded with suspicion, as disreputable
practitioners of an unnecessary trade. If so, and if early policymakers regarded the
"American rule" as likely to reduce overall expenditures on lawyers, then adoption
of the rule can be explained in terms of its anticipated economic effects. That is,
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The United States Supreme Court, which adopted the American rule
in 1796, 4 ' has set forth three reasons in support of it. First, in many cases
the result of the litigation is uncertain and, as a result, it is unfair to pe-
nalize a losing party by assessing costs and fees for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit.42 Second, if losing parties were forced to bear
their opponents' costs and fees, "the poor might be unjustly discouraged
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights."'3 Third, claims for
costs and fees would likely increase "the time, expense and difficulties
of proof' in any given case and "would pose substantial burdens for the
administration of justice. 44
The American rule also applies to arbitrations in the United States.
In general, an arbitral tribunal may award costs or fees "only if the par-
ties' contract, a specific statute, or the arbitration rules so allow.' ' 5
The governing federal arbitration statute is the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA),46 which applies, inter alia, to actions involving interstate
47commerce and to international arbitrations. It does not contain any
provisions regarding the allocation of costs and attorneys' fees.48
With respect to state arbitration laws, most states have adopted the
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA),49 which states that "[u]nless otherwise
provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees,
the early American attitude toward lawyers would logically have supported the
adoption of the rule if it were thought that the result would be a reduction on the
overall social expenditure on lawyers.
Id. at 174.
41. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
42. See Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 83 U.S. 211,231 (1872)).
45. THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 123:01 (1999).
46. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. (1994).
47. The FAA is divided into three chapters. The first chapter focuses principally on do-
mestic arbitrations, although it also applies to "foreign commerce." See 9 U.S.C. § 1. The
second chapter deals with non-domestic disputes and incorporates the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). See 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-07. It also incorporates chapter 1 to the extent that it does not conflict with
chapter 2 or the New York Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 208. Chapter 3 incorporates into the FAA
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration and incorporates
chapter I to the extent that it does not conflict with chapter 3 or the Inter-American Conven-
tion. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07.
48. See Menke v. Monchecourt, 17 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994); see also In re Ar-
bitration Between Trans Chemical Ltd. and China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F.
Supp. 266, 311-12 (S.D. Texas 1997) (stating that arbitrators generally lack the authority to
award attorneys' fees absent statutory authorization); Raytheon Co. v. Computer Distribu-
tors, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 553, 560 (D. Mass. 1986) (same).
49. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UAA, a model law
promulgated in 1955 and amended in 1956. For a list of states that have adopted the UAA,
see 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
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together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the
conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award."50 This
language has been interpreted by courts to mean that attorneys' fees are
not recoverable in arbitration unless the parties agreed to them or a stat-
ute otherwise provides for their award.5 Accordingly, attorneys' fees
typically are not awarded in domestic arbitrations."
Although states generally prohibit arbitral awards of attorneys' fees
in domestic arbitrations, some states have allowed them in international
arbitrations. 3 For example, in California, in domestic arbitrations, each
party pays its own pro rata share of expenses, together with the expenses
of the arbitrators, not including attorneys' fees or witness fees, unless
the parties otherwise agree. 4 However, in international arbitrations,
California law provides that "in making an award for costs the arbitral
tribunal may include as costs... legal fees and expenses.'5
A number of exceptions to the American rule have developed 6
First, arbitrators may award attorneys' fees if authorized by the parties
50. Uniform Arbitration Act § 10, 7 U.L.A. 250 (1997).
51. See, e.g., Compton v. Lemon Ranches, Ltd., 972 P.2d 1078, 1079 (Co. Ct. App.
1999); Myron Assoc., Inc. v. Obstfeld, 638 N.Y.2d 154, 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal
denied, 670 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1996); Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 882
P.2d 1274, 1277-79 (Ariz. 1994); J.M. Owen Bldg. Contractors v. College Walk, Ltd., 400
S.E.2d 468, 471 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 665
P.2d 1046 (Idaho 1983).
52. See MARTIN DOmKE, DOMIE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 43.01, at 535 (1996 &
Supp. 1999) (stating that as a general principle the fees of attorneys who participate in the
arbitration as counsel cannot become part of the award); see also STUART M. SPEISER, AT-
TORNEYS' FEES § 12:3, at 463-4 ("It has been the consistent rule throughout the United
States that a litigant has no inherent right to have [its] attorneys' fees paid by [its] opponent
or opponents.").
53. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.19(3)-(4) (West 1996); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 658D-
7(6) (Michie 1996); Thx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 172.254 (West 1996).
54. See CAL. Civ. PRO. CoDE § 1284.2 (West 1988).
55. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1297.318 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
56. See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1578-87 (1993). Even where an
exception is present, a conflicting legal rule may prevent an award of attorneys' fees. For
instance, some courts have held that certain statutes prohibit awards of attorneys' fees even
where the arbitration agreement expressly authorizes the arbitrator to do so. See, e.g., J.M.
Owen Bldg. Contractors, Inc. v. College Walk, Ltd., 400 S.E.2d 468 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991);
Victoria v. Superior Ct., 710 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1985). Other state courts have held that, because
the FAA is inapplicable to state law, attorneys' fees cannot be awarded without the specific
statutory guidelines. See S.J. Agnew v. Lacey Co-Ply, 654 P.2d 712 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
But see Leaf v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Simi-
larly, one court has held that, even where there is a state statute authorizing the award of
attorneys' fees, such fees may not be awarded unless the parties authorize them by agree-
ment. See, e.g., Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis of New Eng., 401 N.E.2d 839 (Mass. 1980).
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in their agreement." Second, the applicable law or arbitral rules may
expressly authorize an award of attorneys' fees." Numerous federal and
state statutes provide for some shifting of attorneys' fees.59 In addition,
as noted, a number of states have adopted international arbitration laws
that authorize an arbitrator to award attorneys' fees.60 Third, attorneys'
fees may be awarded against a party who has been found guilty of con-
tempt of court, has acted in bad faith, or engaged in other misconduct.
6
'
II. TRIBUNAL AwARDs OF COSTS AND FEES
Although most countries apply the principle that costs follow the
event, they do not employ a uniform method for awarding costs and
fees. In general, arbitrators entertaining a claim for costs and fees con-
sider three issues: (1) whether they have the authority to award costs and
fees; (2) if so, how they should be allocated between the parties; and (3)
how much should be awarded. If the parties' agreement addresses these
issues, the arbitrators will usually resolve the claim for costs and fees in
accord with the agreement. However, agreements frequently fail to ad-
dress this issue, or are ambiguous as to how such claims should be
decided. In these situations, arbitrators have resolved claims for costs
and fees by relying on the applicable national law, the arbitral rules gov-
erning the dispute, or principles of fairness and reasonableness. These
differing approaches are sometimes difficult to apply. Moreover, they
typically result in inconsistent or arbitrary awards.
57. See, e.g., Advanced Tech. Assoc., Inc. v. Seligman, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (D. Kan.
1999); In re Application of RAS Sec. Corp., 674 N.Y.S.2d 303 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998);
Sylvester v. Abdalla, 903 P.2d 410 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind,
33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also Akintobi v. Phoenix Fire Restoration Co.,
Inc., 513 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that the parties implicitly agreed to arbitrate
attorneys' fee issue when they claimed such fees in arbitration).
58. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1994); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000b-l, 2000e-5(k) (1994); see also Wetter & Priem, supra note
15, at 284 (noting that some 200 federal statutes authorize attorneys' fees).
59. For a discussion of federal and state statutes providing for awards of attorneys' fees,
see Rossi, supra note 39, at §§ 10: 1-11:87.
60. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1297.318 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 684.19(4) (West 1996); HAW. REv. STAT. § 658D-7(d)(6) (Michie 1996); Thx. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 172.254(i) (West 1997).
61. See Widell v. Wolf, 43 F.3d 1150, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1995) (bad faith exception);
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
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A. The Parties' Agreement
Arbitral tribunals will typically enforce a contractual provision on
the awarding of costs and fees.62 Some courts and tribunals, however,
have required that such agreements specifically set forth whether the
tribunal has the power to award costs and fees and, in particular, attor-
neys' fees. 63 For example, in Transvenezualian Shipping Co., S.A. v.
Czarnikow-Rionda Co., Inc., a United States district court overturned an
award of costs and fees on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their
64power by awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. The agree-
ment provided the arbitrators with "the discretion to order that [the
arbitrators'] fees and the expenses and the costs of the arbitration shall
be divided between the parties on any terms which appear just. '65 The
court determined that this clause did not give the arbitrators the power to
award attorneys' fees and legal expenses to the prevailing party. There-
66fore, the award of legal costs was ultra vires.
It also should be noted that a few countries, such as England and
Australia, have statutes that provide that "an agreement which has the
effect that a party is to pay the whole or part of the costs of the arbitra-
tion in any event is only valid if made after the dispute in question has
arisen. 67 There is little case law interpreting these statutes and thus their
scope is unclear; however, they appear to be meant to prohibit agree-
ments that would have the effect of preventing or discouraging a party
68from employing proper legal representation. Consequently, not all
62. See Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Award of 27 May 1991, reprinted in 17 Y.B. COM. ARB. 11,
26-27 (1992) (enforcing the parties' agreement to equally bear all costs and attorneys' fees
although the agreement provided that all disputes were to be settled under the UNCITRAL
Rules, which impose costs on the losing party); see also Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Award of 17
November 1994, reprinted in 21 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13, 38-39 (1996); Final Award No. 6320
(ICC 1992), reprinted in 20 Y.B. COM. ARB. 62, 108-09 (1995); Final Award Nos. 7385 &
7402 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 18 Y.B. COM. ARB. 68, 78-79 (1993); Final Award No. 3572
(ICC 1982), reprinted in 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. 11I, 121 (1989).
63. See Transvenezualian Shipping Co., S.A. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., Inc., 1982
A.M.C. 1458, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a clause in an arbitration agreement that
provided for an award of the "expenses and costs of arbitration" did not include the power to
award attorneys' fees and legal expenses); Midland Navigation v. Equity Maritime Enters,
SMA Award No. 1802 (Mar. 31, 1983) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (finding that
where the parties' agreement did not expressly provide for the awarding of attorneys' fees,
the arbitrator lacked power to make such an award).
64. See Transvenezualian Shipping Co., 1982 A.M.C. at 1458-60.
65. Id. at 1459.
66. See id. at 1460; see Sammi Line Co. v. Altamar Navegacion, S.A., 1985 A.M.C.
1790, 1791 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (following Transvenezualian Shipping Co.).
67. Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 60 (Eng.). See, e.g., Victoria Commercial Arbitra-
tion Act, 1984, art. 34(3) (Austl.).
68. See MICHAEL O'REILLY, COSTS IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS § 1.5, at 5 (2d ed.
1997); see also Windvale Ltd. v. Darlington Insulation Co. Ltd., THE TMses, Dec. 22, 1983
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agreements on the payment of costs and fees will be enforced according
to their terms.
B. National Laws
When a contract is silent or ambiguous on the subject of costs and
fees, some tribunals apply the applicable substantive or procedural law
to resolve claims for them. 69 For example, in Triumph Tankers Ltd. v.
Kerr McGee Refining Corp., the tribunal awarded costs and fees to
claimant based on section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO),70 which expressly permits a party
prevailing under the act to recover all costs of the suit, including reason-
able attorneys' fees.' Similarly, in Final Award No. 6962, the tribunal
applied both the arbitral rules and the applicable procedural law to re-
solve the claim for costs and attorneys' fees." In that case, the governing
arbitral rules, the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), gave the tribunal the power to award costs and fees,
but did not specify the method for doing so." The tribunal thus looked
to French law, which was the governing substantive and procedural
law.74 Because article 696 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure
adheres to the principle that costs follow the event, the panel ordered the
losing party to bear all of the arbitral costs.
7
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Using national law to resolve a claim for costs and fees can be a
complicated, time consuming, and expensive process. Here, the
arbitrator must determine whether substantive or procedural law governs
the awarding of costs and fees. In many instances, the tribunal will
apply the procedural law of the seat of the arbitration76 and select the
(Chancery Div.) (striking down as invalid an agreement in which one party agreed in ad-
vance to pay the costs of the arbitration).
69. See Triumph Tankers Ltd. v. Kerr McGee Refining Corp., Final Award No. 2642
(SMA Mar. 28, 1990), reprinted in 18 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 112, 120 (1993); Final Award No.
6962 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 19 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 184, 193 (1994); Final Award No. 6248
(ICC 1990), reprinted in 19 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 124, 139-40 (1994); Final Award No. 5946
(ICC 1990), reprinted in 16 Y.B. COM. ARB. 97, 118 (1991).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 1 1996).
71. See Triumph Tankers Ltd., 18 YB. COM ARB. at 120.
72. See Final Award No. 6962, 19 YB. COM. ARB. at 193.
73. Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce art. 31 (1998), re-
printed in 22 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 345, 361 (1997).
74. Final Award No. 6962, 19 YB. COM. ARB. at 185, 192. The tribunal stated that it
was applying French procedural law "as a gap filler to the ICC Rules of Arbitration .... Id.
at 192.
75. Id. at 193.
76. See F.A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, reprinted in 2 ARB. Irr'L 241, 245 (1986)
("The lex arbitri cannot be the law of any country other than that of the arbitration tribunal's
seat.").
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substantive law through a choice-of-law analysis." The latter method
entails deciding on a choice-of-law rule that will in turn make it possible
to select a substantive law to apply to the merits of the dispute. The
choice-of-law rule governing the arbitrator's selection can be that of the
jurisdiction of (1) the seat of arbitration, (2) the arbitrator's home
country, (3) the country where the award will be enforced, (4) any state
having a connection with the parties' dispute, (5) an international treaty,
or (6) an international arbitral institution.78 Currently no consensus
exists on which of these choice-of-law rules the arbitrator should apply
in a given case. The lack of uniformity makes it problematic to specify
and predict which country's law will be applied to the dispute.79
The process of selecting a national law to govern the awarding of
costs and fees is particularly complex because it may not be clear
whether the claim for them should be governed by substantive or proce-
dural law. Most countries consider awards for costs and fees to be
governed by procedural law. 0 However, in the United States, courts are
divided on the issue.8' In addition, some fee-shifting laws and rules in
the United States may be viewed as procedural, while others may be
characterized as substantive." It is also possible that a single fee-shifting
77. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 706-
08 (1997).
78. See generally Ole Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, in CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 101 (Julian D. M. Lew ed., 1987);
CRAIG ET AL., supra note 36, at 285. In designating a set of choice-of-law rules, tribunals are
not limited to the above list. For example, some tribunals have selected a set of choice-of-law
rules at random. See Carlo Croff, The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbi-
tration: Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L LAW 613, 620 (1982). Other
tribunals have selected a substantive law without regard to any choice-of-law rule. See Vitek
Danilowicz, The Choice of Applicable Law in International Arbitration, 9 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 235, 268 (1986).
79. See Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Tran-
snational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 24 (1986).
80. See, e.g., NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, supra note 21, at art. 696;
SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at ch. 18, § 8; see also Wetter &
Priem, supra note 15, at 333 (stating that "universally, the allowability of costs and their
allocation is regarded as a matter of procedural law"); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 125, at 357 (1962) (noting that the lexfori is often applied
"both to grant and to deny claims for counsel fees").
81. Compare Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Public Utilities, 887 F.2d 242, 246 (10th Cir.
1989) (considering the awarding of costs and fees to be governed by substantive law), and
Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 1995) (same) and L. Ross,
Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Const. Co., 481 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 1986) (same) with Whiteside v.
New Castle Mut. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1096, 1100 (D. Del. 1984) (ruling that the awarding
of costs and fees is governed by procedural law), and Nitchals v. Williams, 590 P.2d 582,
588 (Kan. 1979) (same) and Bensen v. American Ultramar Ltd., No. 92 CIV. 4420 KMW
NRB, 1997 WL 317343, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1997) (same).
82. One commentator explained the difference between procedural and substantive fee-
shifting laws in the U.S.:
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law may contain both procedural and substantive elements.83 As a result,
an arbitrator may have to spend a significant amount of time examining
fee-shifting laws to determine whether they are substantive or proce-
dural, which may ultimately be unclear.
The complexity involved in selecting a law to apply to a claim for
costs and fees may cause parties and arbitrators to spend considerable
resources to resolve the issue.8" Further, the process may lead to arbi-
trary and unpredictable results." Thus, it is not surprising that, in light
of these difficulties, "arbitrators in international cases routinely award
Procedural fee-shifting laws typically govern conduct during litigation, often by
permitting recovery of fees from those who abuse the judicial process. Substantive
fee-shifting laws typically relate to the remedies available for certain claims, often
encouraging assertions of these claims by providing that prevailing complainants
are entitled to recovery of fees.
Jeffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further Substance/Procedure
Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PITT. L. Rav. 393, 401 (1988). Based on this
characterization, the following fee-shifting rules would be considered procedural, see FED. R.
Civ. P. 68 (providing that if a complaining party rejects a settlement offer and the judgment is
no greater than the amount offered, the complaining party must pay the costs incurred after
the offer was made); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (providing for sanctions, including attorneys' fees, if
an attorney or unrepresented party signs a pleading, written motion or other paper in bad
faith), and the following would be considered to be substantive, see Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994) ("Any person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter ... shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-105-329 (1972) (providing that if a county depository fails to
pay warrants drawn on public funds, the depository must pay the county's collection ex-
penses, including counsel fees). Under Professor Parness' view, however, fee-shifting laws
such as article 696 of the New Code of Civil Procedure in France would be considered sub-
stantive, see Parness, supra, at 434 n.235, which would be contrary to the prevailing
practice. See Final Award No. 6962 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 19 Y.B. COM. ARB. 184, 193
(1994); Final Award No. 5946 (ICC 1990), reprinted in 16 Y.B. CoM. ARa. 97, 118 (1991).
83. See Parness, supra note 82, at 400 n.39 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 has both sub-
stantive and procedural elements).
84. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 98-100 (1994).
85. For example, assume an arbitration takes place in a U.S. jurisdiction that considers
the awarding of costs and fees to be governed by substantive law but, through a choice-of-
law analysis, the substantive law to be applied to the dispute is Swedish law, which considers
the awarding of costs and fees to be procedural. Sweden, under its own choice-of-law rules,
would presumably treat the question as subject to the law of the U.S. jurisdiction, resulting
"in an endless cycle of searching for the appropriate body of substantive law to apply."
Douglas I. Wood, Note, Conflicts-Insurance-Environmental Law-Limited Renvoi Exception
Will Be Utilized When Lex Loci Contractus Indicates that Foreign Jurisdiction Would Apply
Maryland Law to Substantive Issue: American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Artra Group, Inc.,
26 U. BALT. L. REV. 247, 270 (1995). This cycle is ultimately broken by an arbitrary choice.
See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 80, at 335 (stating that such an "infinite circle of two laws
referring to each other has been cut in several equally arbitrary ways").
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[costs and] attorneys' fees, usually without discussing questions of ap-
plicable law."86
C. Arbitral Rules
Tribunals often award costs and fees based on arbitral rules that give
them the authority to do so. 7 The rules of the most widely used arbitral
institutions, as well as the ad hoc arbitration rules set forth by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), provide
the tribunal with the authority to award costs and fees.88 However, the
86. BORN, supra note 84, at 626.
87. See Awards of Aug. 18, 1994 & Nov. 8, 1994 (Ad Hoc), reprinted in 21 YB. CoM.
ARB. 40, 45-46 (1996) (applying the arbitration rules of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe and ruling that the costs of arbitration shall be borne equally by both
parties and that each shall bear its own legal expenses); Award of Feb. 20, 1988 (AAA),
reprinted in 14 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 73, 81 (1989) (holding that "under the [AAA Rules] govern-
ing this arbitration, each party is to bear its own costs, and the expenses of the arbitration are
to be shared equally"); Award of Jan. 4, 1980 (AAA), reprinted in 8 Y.B. COM. ARB. 166,
170 (1983) (applying the AAA Rules and ordering the parties to bear their own legal costs
and share equally the costs of the arbitration); Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana (Ad Hoc
Oct. 27, 1989), reprinted in 19 Y.B. COM. ARB. 11, 30-32 (1994) (applying UNCITRAL
Rules article 38 and ordering respondent to pay $84,781.14 for fees and costs); Final Award
No. 6829 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 19 Y.B. COM. ARB. 167, 183 (1994) (applying article 20 of
the 1988 ICC Rules (permitting allocation and award of costs) and ordering respondent to
pay the fees and costs of arbitration, but requiring each party to bear its own legal costs).
It is unclear whether arbitral tribunals are subject to national laws on the awarding of
costs and fees when the governing arbitral rules give the tribunal the authority to do so.
Some commentators have argued that, in ICC and ICSID arbitrations, the rules give complete
discretion to award costs and fees and arbitrators operating under those rules are not subject
to national laws on costs and fees. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 36, § 19.07, at 338; Lester
Nurick, Costs in InternationalArbitrations, 7 ICSID REv. 57, 58 (1992).
88. American Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules art. 31, reprinted
in 22 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 303, 317 (1997) (stating that "[t]he tribunal shall fix the costs of arbi-
tration in its award" and "may apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that
such apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case"); Lon-
don Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules art. 28.4 (1998) ("Unless the parties
otherwise agree in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall make its orders on both arbitration and
legal costs on the general principle that costs should follow the result of the award or arbi-
tration except where it appears to the Arbitral Tribunal that in the particular circumstances
this approach is inappropriate."); International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, R. 28 (1984) (giving the tribunal the
discretion to allocate costs and fees between the parties); ICC Rules, supra note 73, at art. 31
("[T]he final Award shall fix the costs of the arbitration and decide which of the parties shall
bear them or in what proportion they shall be borne by the parties."); World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration Rules art. 71, reprinted in 20 Y.B. COM. ARB. 340,
367 (1995) (providing that the "Tribunal shall fix the costs of the arbitration" and "shall,
subject to any agreement of the parties, apportion the costs of the arbitration"); United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules art. 40, reprinted in 15
I.L.M. 701 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules] (providing that "the costs of arbitration
shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party" and, with respect to the costs of legal
representation, the tribunal "shall be free to determine which party shall bear such costs or
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rules use different methods to determine the amount and allocation of
such costs and fees. Some rules simply give arbitrators broad discretion
to allocate costs and attorneys' fees in the award. 9 Other rules state that
the losing party should in principle reimburse the winning party for its
costs and fees incurred in the action, but give the tribunal discretion to
deviate from the general rule in light of the circumstances of the case.90
Because arbitral rules generally give the tribunal broad discretion in
awarding costs and fees, awards of cost and fees pursuant to such rules
have varied widely.9'
may apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reason-
able"); Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the International Arbitral Centre of the
Federal Economic Chamber of Vienna art. 19, reprinted in 18 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 206, 215
(1993) (stating that the costs of the arbitration shall be "fixed by the Secretary" and not the
tribunal and providing that the tribunal "shall decide the proportions in which these costs as
well as the costs duly incurred by the parties in respect to legal representation and any fur-
ther expenses for due prosecution of legal claims shall be borne by the parties").
89. See, e.g., ICC Rules, art. 31, supra note 73, at 362 ("The final Award shall fix the
costs of the arbitration and decide which of the parties shall bear them or in what proportion
they shall be borne by the parties."); AAA International Arbitration Rules, supra note 88, at
art. 31 (stating that "the tribunal shall fix the costs of arbitration in its award" and "may
apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable
taking into account the circumstances of the case"); WIPO Arbitration Rules, supra note 88,
at art. 71 (providing that the "tribunal shall fix the costs of the arbitration" and "shall, subject
to any agreement of the parties, apportion the costs of the arbitration"); see also Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Geneva (CCIG) Arbitration Rules art. 36.1, reprinted in 18 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 195, 205 (1993) ("At the end of the proceeding, the CCIG shall determine the
final amount of the costs of arbitration."); Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the Inter-
national Arbitral Centre of the Federal Economic Chamber of Vienna art. 19, reprinted in 18
YB. CoM. ARa. 206, 215 (1993) (the tribunal "shall decide on the proportions in which these
costs as well as the costs duly incurred by the parties in respect of legal representation and
any further expenses for due prosecution of legal claims shall be borne by the parties").
90. See LCIA Rules, supra note 88, at art. 28.4 ("Unless the parties otherwise agree in
writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall make its orders on both arbitration and legal costs on the
general principle that costs should follow the result of the award or arbitration except where
it appears to the Arbitral Tribunal that in the particular circumstances this approach is inap-
propriate."); Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce § 29
(stating that the "losing party shall be ordered to pay such compensation and costs as well as
the costs of the other party unless the circumstances call for a different result"); International
Arbitration Rules of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce art. 56, reprinted in I ARB. MAT'L
215, 225 (1989) (providing that the "costs of the proceedings are, as a rule, borne by the
losing party" but allowing the tribunal "for special reasons" to "depart from this rule, espe-
cially if the proceeding became without object or if a party caused unnecessary costs"); cf.
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 88, at art. 40 (providing that "the costs of arbitration shall in
principle be borne by the unsuccessful party" and, with respect to the costs of legal repre-
sentation, the tribunal "shall be free to determine which party shall bear such costs or may
apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable.").
91. One commentator who undertook a study of ICC awards noted that the ICC Rules,
which give wide discretion to arbitrators in assessing and allocating costs and fees, ulti-
mately may not serve the interests of the arbitrators or the parties:
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Some tribunals have awarded successful parties both costs and at-
torneys' fees.92 Other tribunals have awarded successful parties costs,
including the tribunal's fees, but not attorneys' fees.93 Still others have
required each party to bear its own costs and fees and share equally the
fees and expenses of the tribunal regardless of the outcome of the case.94
For an arbitrator, there is little guidance in the ICC Rules to assist [him or her] in
reaching a decision on costs. The lack of a precise rule in this respect has meant
the absence of a system of precedents or explanations in awards, which would be
necessary to justify the manner in which such a rule might be applied. Conse-
quently, the arbitrator is potentially open to an indeterminate number of rules and
factors from outside the ICC system, which [he or she] may apply at [his or her]
will.
As matters stand, it is not surprising that perhaps the most disappointing
features of the ICC cost system are the failure of arbitrators to rationalize the exer-
cise of their discretion in making the apportionment of costs and that allocations
vary enormously without apparent justification from one arbitration to another.
For the parties, this means that in any given arbitration such allocations are
unpredictable and uncertain.
Michael Bolhler, Costs in ICC Arbitration: A Practitioner's View, 3 Am. REv. 116, 151-52
(1992).
92. See Southern Pac. Properties Ltd. v. Egypt, Award of May 20, 1992 (ICSID), re-
printed in 19 YB. COM. AR. 51, 82-83 (1994) (awarding legal, audit, and arbitration costs
to the claimant that substantially prevailed on its alternative claims for damages); Maritime
Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, Final Award of Jan. 6, 1988 (ICSID),
reprinted in 14 YB. COM. AR3. 82, 90 (1989) (awarding claimant $275,000 for fees and
expenses incurred in the arbitration); Final Award No. 6363 (ICC 1991), reprinted in 17 YB.
COM. A". 186, 211 (1992) (ordering the losing party to pay all of the prevailing party's
attorneys' fees and 85% of the arbitration costs, including arbitrators' fees); Final Award No.
4975 (ICC 1988), reprinted in 14 YB. COM. AR3. 122, 136-37 (1989) (denying claimants'
claims, awarding respondents damages on its counterclaims, and ordering claimants to pay
respondents UK L500,000 for legal costs); Award of May 30, 1979 (ICC), reprinted in 7 YB.
COM. ARE. 87, 95 (1982) (ordering respondent to bear all arbitral costs and legal expenses
totaling $100,000 where claimant had prevailed fully on its claims); Award of Oct. 26, 1979
(ICC), reprinted in 7 Y.B. COM. ARB. 119, 124 (1982) (ordering respondent to pay all arbitral
costs and $60,000 for claimant's legal costs where respondent wrongfully refused to satisfy
claimant's security guarantee); Award of July 13, 1981 (ICC), reprinted in 7 YB. CoM. ARB.
134, 136 (1982) (ruling where claimant had prevailed fully on its initial claims, respondent
should bear all costs of the arbitration); Deepsea Tankers, Inc. v. Westport Petroleum, Inc.,
SMA Award No. 3093 (Jun. 30, 1994), reprinted in 7 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT'L 189,
190-97 (1995) (awarding the successful party a portion of costs and attorneys' fees).
93. See, e.g., Agip v. Congo, 1 ICSID 306, 329 (1979) (awarding arbitration costs but
not attorneys' fees to the party prevailing on all claims); see also Monte Mabu Shipping
Corp. v. World Trade Group, Inc., SMA Award No. 1239 (June 19, 1978) (LEXIS, Admrty
Library, Usawds File) (denying Owner's claim for attorneys' fees and awarding Owner 75%
of the arbitrator fees even though Owner prevailed on almost all of its claims).
94. See, e.g., Scanfleet A.S. v. Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, SMA
Award No. 2464 (Mar. 15, 1988) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (ordering each
party to bear its own costs and finding no grounds for awarding attorneys' fees); see also
Kuwait Petroleum Corp. v. Westport Petroleum, Inc., SMA Award 3244 (Jan. 19, 1996)
(LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (ruling that even though the owner prevailed, both
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Three maritime arbitration decisions illustrate the arbitrariness that
can occur in awarding costs and fees even when a party is wholly or
substantially successful." In Euroleader Shipping and Trading Corp. v.
Stellar Lines, S.A., the tribunal rejected the claimant's contention that
faulty bunkers supplied by the respondent had damaged the claimant's
• 96
vessel and ruled for respondent on its unpaid hire claim. With respect
to the parties' claims for costs and fees, the tribunal denied the claim-
ant's claim and awarded the respondent all of the attorneys' fees sought,
which amounted to $194,513.99. 9'
By contrast, in ARAMCO Services Co. v. EAC Bulk Transport
(N.A.), Inc., the claimant completely prevailed on its claims that the re-
spondent improperly transported and damaged the claimant's cargo.98
While the tribunal awarded the claimant all requested damages plus in-
terest, it awarded only $97,000 out of the $658,143 that claimant
requested for attorneys' fees and costs. Further, the tribunal ordered the
parties to share equally the cost of the stenographic transcripts for the
hearing.99
An altogether different result was reached in Kuwait Petroleum
Corp. v. Westport Petroleum.'°° There, the tribunal ruled in favor of
Kuwait Petroleum on its claim for payment of monies owed by West-
port Petroleum for the charter of its ship, but denied Kuwait Petroleum's
claim for costs and fees. The panel stated that "while finding in favor of
[Kuwait Petroleum,] ... the circumstances of the case do not warrant an
parties were to bear their own costs and to share the arbitration costs, with the owner paying
40% and the charter paying 60%). A study of ICC cases rendered between 1989 and 1991
found that where claimant won all or most of what it claimed, the arbitrators ordered in 80%
of the cases the respondent to pay "all or most.., of the arbitrators fees and expenses, al-
though the arbitrators occasionally split the costs between the parties in such circumstances."
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 21-22. In half of the cases surveyed, the arbitrators order the
losing party "to pay all or part of the claimant's 'normal legal costs.'" Id. at 22.
95. The rules of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. (SMA) give the tribunal broad
discretion to award costs and fees. See Maritime Arbitration Rules of the Society of Maritime
Arbitrators, Inc. § 30, reprinted in WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT'L 227, 233 (Jan. 1995)
(stating that "the Panel, in its Award, shall assess arbitration expenses and fees.., and shall
address the issue of attorneys' fees and expenses or costs incurred by the parties" and that it
is "empowered to award reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses or costs incurred by a party
or parties in the prosecution or defense of the case").
96. Euroleader Shipping and Trading Corp. v. Stellar Lines, S.A., SMA No. 3528, at 8
(May 7, 1999) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawards File).
97. Id.
98. See SMA No. 3118 (Nov. 1, 1994), reprinted in 7 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT'L 129
(1995).
99. See id. at 136.
100. Kuwait Petroleum Corp. v. Westport Petroleum Corp., SMA No. 3244 (Jan. 19,
1996) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawards File).
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award of legal costs to either party" and, as a result, "[e]ach party will
bear its own costs of bringing this matter to arbitration."' 0'
While in all three cases one party completely prevailed, the tribunal
in each case reached a different result with respect to the claims for costs
and fees: the Euroleader tribunal awarded the successful party all costs
and fees claimed; the ARAMCO tribunal awarded the prevailing party a
small portion of its costs and fees; and the Kuwait Petroleum Corp. tri-
bunal awarded the successful party no costs and fees. The result is the
same when a party is only partially successful.
When a party has prevailed on some but not all of its claims, tribu-
nals have taken a variety of approaches. Some tribunals have awarded a
party who has partially prevailed a portion of the costs and fees
claimed.0 2 Others have awarded a partially successful party only a part
of the costs claimed, but no attorneys' fees.'0 3 A number of tribunals
have ordered the parties to bear their own costs and to share equally the
costs and expenses of the tribunal. 04
101. Id. at 5.
102. See Final Award No. 6752 (ICC 1991), reprinted in 18 YB. CoM. ARB. 54, 57
(1993) ("charging the first respondent for the costs of this arbitration [and ordering that
party] to pay a fair part of the fees of claimant's counsel"); Award of Feb. 16, 1983 (ICC),
reprinted in 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 111, 123-24 (1984) (ruling that where claimants only partially
succeeded on their claims, respondents bore 80% of the costs of the arbitration and owed
claimants $730,704 for legal costs).
103. See Final Award No. 6573 (1991), reprinted in 20 YB. COM. ARB. 110, 125 (1995)
(holding that respondent shall bear 80% and claimant 20% of the arbitration costs and that
each party shall bear its own legal fees); Final Award No. 6829 (1992), reprinted in 19 YB.
CoM. ARB. 167, 183 (1994) (ordering respondent to pay fees and expenses of the arbitrators
and the administrative costs of the ICC, and requiring each party to bear its own legal costs);
Final Award No. 5649 (1987), reprinted in 14 YB. CoM. ARB. 174, 179 (1989) (ordering that
claimant pay three fourths of the ICC's administrative fees and arbitrators' fees, and that
respondent pay one fourth); Final Award No. 3267 (1984), reprinted in 12 Y.B. COM. ArB.
87, 96 (1987) (ordering claimant to pay one third of the costs of the arbitration and respon-
dent to pay two thirds of the costs, and that each party bear its own legal costs); Final Award
No. 2090 (1976), reprinted in 5 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 131, 132-133 (1981) (ruling that where
claimant recovered FF 250,000 of FF 1,325,910 that it originally sought from respondent,
respondent should bear two thirds of the arbitration costs and claimant one third).
104. See Kemoil, Ltd. v. K/S Bertina, SMA No. 3144 (Feb. 17, 1995), reprinted in 7
WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT'L 241, 260 (1995) (ordering the parties to bear their own fees
and costs and to share equally the cost of the hearing transcripts where each party was par-
tially successful on their respective claims); Award of July 23, 1981 (Ad Hoc), reprinted in 8
YB. COM. ARB. 89, 94 (1983) (same); Great Beluga Shipping Inc. v. Bayoil Inc., SMA
Award No. 3033 (Dec. 21, 1993) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (ordering each party
to bear their own costs where claimant did not fully prevail on its claim); Soci6t6 Ouest-
Africaine des Btons Industriels (SOABI) v. Republic of Senegal, Award of Feb. 25, 1988
(ICSID) (same), reprinted in 17 Y.B. COM. ARB. 42, 69 (1992); Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic
of Indonesia, Final Award of Jun. 5, 1990 (ICSID), reprinted in 17 YB. CoM. ARB. 73, 105
(1992) (same); Final Award No. 7181 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 21 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 99, 112
(1996); Award of Feb. 17, 1984, reprinted in 10 YB. COM. ARB. 52, 60 (ICC 1985) (same).
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Tribunals also differ on how to allocate costs and fees between the
parties. Some tribunals award costs and fees in proportion to the parties'
level of success on their claims.'0 5 For example, in Final Award No.
5759, the partially successful claimant requested that the respondent pay
all costs incurred by the claimant during the arbitration.'0 6 The tribunal
held that, because the claimant prevailed on 75% of the claims it raised
in the arbitration, it was entitled to have 75% of its arbitration costs paid
by the respondent. 107
Other tribunals offset the reimbursement claims. In Final Award No.
7047, the tribunal determined that the claimant prevailed on 50% of its
claims.'0 ' As a result, it was entitled to be reimbursed for 50% of its
costs and fees less its obligation to reimburse respondents for 50% of
their costs and fees, because respondents "had the same proportional
success with their defence." The claims offset each other and thus each
party was required to bear its own legal costs, and to split the costs of
the tribunal.'0 9
In sum, while arbitral rules may provide the tribunal with the
authority to award costs and fees, they typically fail to provide sufficient
guidance on how to do so. As a result, tribunal awards of costs and fees
pursuant to arbitral rules have often been arbitrary and inconsistent.
105. See, e.g., Final Award No. 6998 (ICC 1994), reprinted in 21 YB. COM. ARB. 54,
78 (1996) (awarding claimants 75% of the costs of the arbitration and legal expenses);
Award of Aug. 13, 1981 (ICC), reprinted in 9 YB. COM. ARB. 124, 130-31 (1984) (ruling
that, where respondent was three fifths at fault and claimant two fifths, respondent should
pay three fifths of the costs of the arbitration and claimant two fifths); see also Final Award
No. 7047 (ICC 1994), reprinted in 21 YB. COM. ARB. 79, 98 (1996) (ordering, where claim-
ant and respondents each succeeded on 50% of their respective claims, claimant was
responsible for 50% of the costs and that each of the two respondents were responsible for
25%, and that each of the parties bear their own legal costs). But see Final Award No. 2795
(ICC 1977), reprinted in 4 YB. COM. ARB. 210, 212 (1979) (awarding claimant damages but
also ordering claimant to pay 90% of the costs of the arbitration).
106. Final Award No. 5759 (ICC 1989), reprinted in 18 Y.B. COM. ARB. 34, 42-43
(1993).
107. Id. But cf. ICC Nos. 3099 and 3100 (May 30, 1979), reprinted in 7 YB. COM. ARB.
87, 95 (ruling that, although claimant sought $13 million in damages and recovered only
$1.35 million, respondent should "bear not only all of the costs of the arbitration, but also the
normal legal costs of claimant").
108. Final Award No. 7047 (ICC 1994), reprinted in 21 YB. COM. ARB. 79, 98 (1996).
109. Id. See also Final Award No. 1250 (ICC 1964), reprinted in 5 YB. COM. ARB. 168,
170 (1980) (awarding claimant damages for one year of lost profit under the disputed con-
tract, although claimant had claimed two years, and ruling that "each party had to pay the
costs it had incurred for the arbitration, and that they each had to pay half of the fees and
expenses of the arbitrators").
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D. Fairness and Reasonableness
Some tribunals do not apply a particular law to a claim for costs and
fees, but instead rely on principles of fairness and reasonableness."' The
advantage of applying principles of fairness is that it allows arbitrators
to tailor awards of costs and fees to the circumstances of each case.
However, this flexibility makes it possible that awards will vary sub-
stantially from case to case because individual perceptions of what is
fair or reasonable can differ significantly.
In SPP Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, for example, the claimant
sought $42.5 million in damages, but the tribunal awarded it $12.5 mil-
lion." Although the tribunal recognized that the sum awarded was
"significantly less than what was requested," it determined that the
"right course to follow" was to award the claimant 80% of its arbitration
and legal costs."2
In Final Award No. 6527, another tribunal faced with similar cir-
cumstances came to a different conclusion." 3 There, the tribunal
determined that the claimant's cause of action was justified. However,
• 114
because the tribunal believed that the damages sought were excessive,
it ruled that under the circumstances it was "appropriate [that] each
party... bear its own legal costs and for the parties to share equally the
other costs of the proceedings.""''
110. See Bonair Trading N.A., Ltd. v. Bessie Compania Naviera, S.A., SMA Award No.
2226 (Sept. 30, 1985), reprinted in 12 Y.B. COM. ARB. 162, 164-65 (1987); Final Award No.
5649 (ICC 1987), reprinted in 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. 174, 179 (1989); Final Award No. 6197
(ICC 1995), reprinted in 23 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13, 29 (1998); Final Award No. 7301 (ICC
1993), reprinted in 23 Y.B. COM. ARB. 42, 48 (1998). Related to this approach is the concept
of amiable compositeur, which allows the arbitrator to decide the dispute on the basis of
equity and fairness, rather than the strict application of a given law. Most institutional rules
do not permit this option unless specifically so agreed by the parties. See REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 6, at 92; BORN, supra note 84, at 135. See also Final Award No. 3267
(1984), reprinted in 12 Y.B. CoM. ArB. 87, 89-96 (1989) (discussing the scope and nature of
the powers of arbitrators acting as amiable compositeurs).
111. SPP (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICC No. YD/AS No. 3493 (Feb.
16, 1983), reprinted in 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 111, 122-23 (1984).
112. Id. at 123. Similarly, in Award of May 30, 1979, an ICC panel awarded claimant
all its arbitration and legal costs although the claimant claimed $13 million in damages and
was only awarded $1.4 million. Award of May 30, 1979 (ICC), reprinted in 7 YB. COM. ARB.
87, 95.
113. Final Award No. 6527 (ICC 1991), reprinted in 18 YB. COM. ARB. 44, 53 (1993).
114. Id.
115. Id. But see Bayway Refining Co. v. SeaRiver Maritime Inc., SMA Award No. 3489
at 7-8 (Dec. 4, 1998) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File). There, Bayway Refining Co.
claimed that SeaRiver Maritime, Inc.'s vessels had damaged its cargo during transportation.
SeaRiver counterclaimed that it was entitled to damages for detention, fuel costs and dead-
freight amounting to approximately $184,000. Each side also claimed attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to a clause that gave the arbitrators the authority to award reasonable fees and
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By contrast, in Norse Management Co. (PTE) Ltd. v. ATI Int'l Ltd.,
the claimant prevailed entirely on its claim for monies owed under its
charter agreement with respondent and the tribunal awarded claimant all
damages sought. With respect to attorneys' fees, however, the tribunal
deemed it reasonable to award the claimant only 60% of the fees
sought."6
These cases illustrate that doctrines of fairness and reasonableness
allow the arbitrators to exercise wide discretion in awarding costs and
fees. This ultimately leads to a lack of uniformity.
This survey of tribunal decisions reveals that "[i]t is impossible to
identify any general practice as to the treatment of costs in international
commercial arbitrations.""' Moreover, the methods used by arbitrators
to award costs and fees have led to inconsistent and arbitrary awards. In
similar cases, arbitrators have reached different conclusions on whether
costs and fees should be awarded and, in cases where they are awarded,
there is no consensus on the amount of costs and fees that should be
paid to the prevailing party.
This diversity in practices and rules has led to similarly situated
parties receiving vastly different amounts for costs and fees.!" In addi-
tion, it has made it difficult, if not impossible, for parties to predict with
any degree of certainty the outcome of a claim for costs and fees, which
may be financially significant. The lack of predictability and certainty
costs. The arbitrators denied Bayway's cargo damage claim and awarded SeaRiver $122,000
in damages, or 66% of the amount it claimed. With respect to SeaRiver's claim for costs and
fees, which amounted to $47,000, the panel awarded it $31,000, or 66% of the fees sought.
116. Norse Management Co. (PTE) Ltd. v. ATI International Ltd., SMA Award No.
1691 (June 10, 1982) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (finding it reasonable to award
Charterer 60% of its attorneys' fees although Charterer prevailed almost entirely on its
claim); see Bonaire Trading N.A., Ltd., 12 YB. COM. AR. at 164-65 (awarding respondent
less than 50% of the legal costs requested even though respondent had participated in four
hearings before the tribunal and claimant's claims were dismissed with prejudice for failure
to prosecute); cf Monte Mabu Shipping Corp. v. World Trade Group, Inc., SMA Award No.
1239 (June 19, 1978) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (denying Owner's claim for
attorneys' fees and awarding Owner 75% of the arbitrator fees even though Owner prevailed
on almost all of its claims).
117. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 6, at 407; see Nurick, supra note 87, at 58
(stating "there is no uniform pattern in the cases" awarding costs and fees).
118. Buhler, supra note 91, at 152 (stating that "perhaps [the] most disappointing fea-
tures of the ICC Cost system are the failure of arbitrators to rationalize the exercise of their
discretion in making the apportionment of costs and that allocations vary enormously with-
out apparent justification from one arbitration to another").
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on this issue makes it difficult for parties to evaluate their case and settle
the dispute." It also undermines the legitimacy of the arbitral process. 2
In. A MODEL APPROACH FOR AWARDING
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
The problems associated with the current way that arbitral tribunals
evaluate claims for costs and fees could be remedied by adopting the
following model. The model could apply to an international arbitration
in a variety of ways. The model could be included in a country's laws
governing international arbitrations, becoming applicable through a
choice of law analysis.' 2 This form of the model is set forth below and
will be discussed in the following sections. With minor revisions, the
model also could be inserted as a provision in the parties' agreement
123
or incorporated into a set of arbitral rules. 
4
In general, the model recognizes any agreement between the parties
as the primary authority for resolving claims for costs. In the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, it explicitly empowers the arbitral tribunal
to adjudicate claims for costs and fees and sets forth guidelines for the
tribunals to follow in evaluating such claims. The model states:
Costs and Fees
(1) The parties shall be free to agree on rules regarding the costs
of the arbitration either directly or by reference to arbitral
rules.
(2) Unless the agreement of the parties provides otherwise, ei-
ther directly of by reference to arbitral rules, the following
rules apply:
119. See id. (noting that for parties "in any given arbitration such allocations [of costs
and fees] are unpredictable and uncertain").
120. See BORN, supra note 84, at 5-8 (discussing neutrality and predictability as essen-
tial aspects of arbitration).
121. Neither the model nor the text of this article address the issue of security for costs
as it is beyond the scope of the article and is, in itself, a complicated issue affected by the
variety of approaches utilized by different countries.
122. In the United States, this model language may be adopted into either state statutes
or a federal statute. In addition, the model language is designed to apply only to international
arbitrations and does not apply in domestic disputes.
123. See Appendix A.
124. See Appendix B.
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(a) Authority to Award Costs of the Arbitration. The arbitral
tribunal shall have the authority to make an award allocating
the costs of the arbitration between the parties.
(b) Allocating Costs of the Arbitration. The costs of the ar-
bitration shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful
party. However, at its discretion, the tribunal may (i) appor-
tion such costs, in whole or in part, between the parties if it
determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into ac-
count the circumstances of the case, or (ii) otherwise depart
from this rule for special reasons.
(c) Defining Costs of the Arbitration. The costs of the arbi-
tration shall be reasonable in amount and shall include but
not be limited to:
(i) the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal;
(ii) any fees and expenses of the appointing
authority;
(ii) the costs of expert advice and of other assistance
required by the arbitral tribunal;
(iii) the travel and other expenses of witnesses; and
(iv) the legal or other costs of the parties.'25
A. Enforcing the Parties' Agreement
The model requires tribunals to enforce any agreement by the parties
on the payment of costs and fees. Such an agreement can be explicitly
125. The model does not explicitly provide that the arbitrators must state the reasons
for an award of costs and fees because many national laws as well as the most widely used
international arbitration rules provide for reasoned awards and it is the settled practice for
arbitrators to issue reasoned awards in international arbitrations. See Donald Francis Dono-
van & David W. Rivkin, International Arbitration & Dispute Resolution, P.L.I. COMMERCIAL
L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SER. 23 (Mar. 1999); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 6, at
84; BORN, supra note 84, at 94; HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE
TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY & CoMMENTARY 837-38 (1989). To explicitly require the tribunal to set forth
the reasons for awarding costs and fees, the following provision may be added to the model
after section 2(c)(iv): (3) In any order for costs of the arbitration, the tribunal shall state the
reasons for the award.
For a discussion of reasoned awards in arbitration see, Thomas E. Carbonneau, Render-
ing Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International
Transactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579 (1985); Stephen L. Hayford, A New Para-
digm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between reasoned Awards
and Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 443 (1998).
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set forth by the parties or it can be incorporated by reference to arbitral
rules that provide the tribunal with the authority to award costs and fees.
This approach would create predictability and certainty for transnational
contracting parties who agree to arbitrate any disputes. Moreover, it
protects party autonomy by giving parties the freedom to choose and be
bound by procedures to which they mutually agree.126
It is a well recognized principle that "parties to an international
contract have the power to define the process by which any future con-
tract dispute will be settled.' 27 They may define, among other things,
the scope of issues for arbitration, ' the situs of the arbitration, 29 the
substantive law to be applied,'30 and the procedural rules to govern the
dispute. 3 ' Accordingly, parties should be free to agree upon the rules for
the payment of costs and fees in the event of arbitration, and these
agreements should be enforced by courts and tribunals.'32 In fact, this
126. See Howard M. Holtzmann, Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility in
International Arbitration Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY: TowARDs "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 3, 5 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N.
Brower eds., 1993); Karl-Heinz B6ckstiegel, Public Policy and Arbitrability, in COMPARA-
TIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 177, 178 (Pieter Sanders
ed., 1986); Vitek Danilowicz, The Choice of Applicable Law in International Arbitration, 9
HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 235, 268 (1985); Craig M. Gertz, Comment, The Selection
of Choice of Law Provisions in International Commercial Arbitration: A Case for Contrac-
tual Dececage, 12 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163 (1991).
127. John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbi-
trations in the Wake of Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 38 HARv. INT'L L.J.
59, 88 (1997).
128. See Bernard G. Poznanski, The Nature and Extent of an Arbitrator's Powers in
International CommercialArbitration, 4 J. INT'L ARu. 71, 84 (Sept. 1987).
129. See REISMAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 172 (1997).
130. See Yves Derains, Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in Inter-
national Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
ARBITRATION 227, 254 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1986); see also UNCITRAL Model Law at art.
28(1), reprinted in HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 125, at 746 ("The arbitral tribunal
shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as
applicable to the substance of the dispute.").
131. See Act on the Reform of the Law Relating to Arbitral Proceedings of 22 Decem-
ber 1997, § 1042, Bundesgesetzblatt part I, at 3224 (1997) (unofficial translation by the
German Institution of Arbitration and the German Federal Ministry of Justice 1998)
[hereinafter German Arbitration Law of 1998] (stating that "subject to the mandatory provi-
sions of this Book, the parties are free to determine the procedure themselves or by reference
to a set of arbitration rules"); Swiss Private International Law Statute of 18 December 1987,
182(1) (stating that "the parties may directly, or by reference to arbitration rules, determine
the arbitral procedure"); Geneva Protocol of 1923 art. 2 (providing that "the arbitral proce-
dure ... shall be governed by the will of the parties"); see also Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(d) (permitting nonrecogni-
tion of an arbitral award if "the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement
of the parties"), June 10, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 201-09 (1998) [hereinafter New York Convention].
132. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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position is already in accord with the practice of tribunals in interna-
tional commercial arbitrations. Arbitrators typically honor express
agreements allocating costs and fees.' They also generally assume the
power to award costs and fees if the arbitral rules agreed on by the par-
ties give the tribunal this authority.11
4
In some cases, an express provision contained in the parties' agree-
ment may conflict with the arbitral rules on the awarding of costs and
fees. In these circumstances, the general rule is that the express provi-
sion controls.'35 This principle is illustrated by the tribunal's decision in
Final Award of May 27, 1991.13
6
There, the arbitration agreement stated that all of the costs of the ar-
bitration, including attorneys' fees, were to be borne equally by the
parties, except in the event of a willful default.'37 However, the agree-
ment also stated that all disputes were to be settled by arbitration under
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration
Rules, which provide that the costs of arbitration shall in principle be
borne by the losing party.'38 In resolving the claim for costs and fees, the
tribunal held that the relevant provisions of the UNCITRAL Rules were
inapplicable, since the parties had expressly provided for an alternative
method of cost allocation in their agreement. ' The tribunal found no
133. See, e.g., Final Award Nos. 7385 & 7402 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 18 YB. CoM.
ARB. 68, 78-79 (1993) (requiring that costs be equally divided between buyer and seller as
provided in the parties' contract); Final Award No. 3572 (ICC 1982), reprinted in 14 YB.
COM. ARB. 111, 121 (1989) (awarding costs and fees to the non-defaulting parties as pro-
vided for in the operating agreement); Final Award of Nov. 17, 1994 (Ad Hoc), reprinted in
21 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13, 38 (1996) (ruling that the parties shall bear the costs equally and
stating that in determining who shall bear the costs of the arbitration, the tribunal will not
look beyond the express and clear words of the parties agreement); Final Award No. 6320
(ICC 1992), reprinted in 20 YB. COM. Axa. 62, 108-09 (1995) (requiring that each party pay
their own costs as provided by the explicit language of the parties' contract).
134. See, e.g., Awards of Aug. 18, 1994 & Nov. 8, 1994 (Ad Hoc), reprinted in 21 YB.
CoM. ARE. 40, 45-46 (1996) (applying the arbitration rules of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe and ruling that the costs of arbitration shall be borne equally by both
parties and that each shall bear its own legal expenses); Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana
(Ad Hoc Oct. 27, 1989), reprinted in 19 YB. COM. ARB. 11, 30-32 (1994) (applying
UNCITRAL Rules article 38 and ordering respondent to pay $84,781.14 for fees and costs);
Final Award No. 6829 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 19 YB. COM. ARB. 167, 183 (1994)
(applying article 20 of the 1988 ICC Rules (permitting allocation and award of costs) and
ordering respondent to pay the fees and costs of arbitration, but requiring each party to bear
its own legal costs).
135. See Szuts v. Reynolds, 931 F.2d 830, 831-32 (11th Cir. 1991); Final Award of
May 27, 1991 (Ad Hoc), reprinted in 17 YB. COM. ARB. 11, 26 (1992).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules art.
40, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules].
139. See Final Award of May 27, 1991, 17 Y.B. COM. Aiw. at 27.
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willful default and ordered the parties to share the arbitration costs
equally and to bear their own costs for attorneys' fees, experts, travel,
and other expenses.140
It is important to note that deference to the agreement of the parties
is not absolute. Arbitrators are not bound by the parties' agreement if
there is a compelling reason to disregard it. 14 This exception typically
"is narrowly limited to those situations where upholding the provision
would violate some fundamental public policy, be clearly against the
parties' true intentions, or manifest some extreme prejudice or injustice
to one party.' ' 2
In general, the American rule does not amount to a fundamental
United States public policy that would require an arbitrator sitting in the
United States or applying American law to disregard a contractual pro-
vision on the payment of costs and fees.' 43 Indeed, as noted in section
I(c), most states permit arbitrators to award costs and fees if the parties'
144
agreement provides the arbitrator with the power to do so.
140. Id. An agreement by the parties on the awarding of costs and fees also may con-
flict with national law if the model is not adopted by the relevant country but the parties
incorporate the model into their agreement (either by express provision or by agreeing to
apply arbitral rules that adopt the model). Here again, courts and tribunals should give effect
to the parties' agreement on the awarding of costs and fees notwithstanding national law to
the contrary unless to do so would violate a fundamental public policy. See generally Clar-
endon Mktg., Inc. v. CT Chem. (USA) Inc., No. 93 Civ. 0285 [PKL], U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10796
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1993) (confirming an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party when
the agreement stated that arbitration would be governed by New York law, which does not
allow for the awarding of attorneys' fees unless provided in the agreement, and the Maritime
Arbitration Rules (SMA), which allow for the discretionary award of fees); see also infra text
accompany notes 143-148.
141. See, e.g., Partial Award No. 3267 (ICC 1979), reprinted in 7 Y.B. COM. ARB. 96,
105 (1982) (stating that "it is a generally accepted principle in international arbitration that
the paramount duty of the arbitrator ... is to apply the contract of the parties, unless it is
shown that the provisions relied on are clearly against the true intent of the parties, or violate
a basic commonly accepted principle of public policy"); see also Marc Blessing, Mandatory
Rules of Law Versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 23 (Dec.
1997).
142. John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Interest in International Commercial Arbitration, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 40, 57 (1996); see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Iran, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 181, 192 (1984); 3 MARJOIlE M. WIIITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981,
1990 (1943).
143. See OEHMKE, supra note 45, at §§ 123:08-123:09 (noting that "public policy does
not prohibit parties from agreeing to an award of attorneys' fees"); see also Hope Assoc.,
Inc. v. Marvin M. Black Co., 422 S.E.2d 918, 919 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
144. See supra note 57. See also In re Application of RAS Sec. Corp., 674 N.Y.S.2d
303, 303 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that arbitrators were empowered to award attor-
neys' fees pursuant to the parties' agreement); accord Advanced Tech. Assoc., Inc. v.
Seligman, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1317 (D. Kan. 1999); Sylvester v. Abdalla, 903 P.2d 410,
412 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 831 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994).
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The rationale for enforcing agreements on the awarding of costs and
fees was explained by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Hope & Assoc.,
Inc. v. Marvin Black Co.'45 At issue in that case was whether a contract
clause giving the arbitrator the authority to award attorneys' fees was
prohibited by statute or public policy. The court initially noted that the
state's arbitration statute provided that "[u]nless otherwise provided in
the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrator's expenses and fees, together
with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct
of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award.' ' 46 This statute,
the court ruled, did not prohibit parties from contracting for the recovery
of attorneys' fees in arbitration. According to the court, to construe the
statute to preclude parties from being able to contract for the recovery of
attorneys' fees would amount to a "'restraint on the common-law right
of the freedom to contract.', 47 The court also ruled that a contract for the
recovery of attorneys' fees in arbitration would not violate public policy.
The court explained:
There is no general public policy against contracting for the re-
covery of attorneys' fees .... Indeed, the public policy of this
state favors enforcement of the terms of an arbitration agree-
ment .... If the parties contract for attorneys' fees, that
agreement will be enforced.'
148
145. Hope Assoc. Inc., supra note 143, at 918.
146. Id. at 919 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-17 (Supp. 1999)). This statutory provi-
sion is similar to section 10 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which has been adopted by most
states. See supra notes 49-50.
147. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Pehor, 31 S.E. 779 (1898), quoted in Hope & Assoc.,
Inc., 422 S.E.2d at 919.
148. Id. As noted, a few countries, such as England and Australia, have statutes which
provide that "an agreement which has the effect that a party is to pay the whole or part of the
costs of the arbitration in any event is only valid if made after the dispute in question has
arisen." Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 60 (Eng.). See, e.g., Victoria Commercial Arbitration
Act, 1984, art. 34(3) (Austl.). It appears that these statutes are narrowly construed and would
not conflict with the model if it were adopted by agreement of the parties. These statutes
prohibit agreements that prevent or discourage a party from employing proper legal repre-
sentation. See John Uff, The Predictability Factor in International Arbitration, in
COMMRcIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 156 (Odams & Higgins eds., 1996); see also Windvale
Ltd. v. Darlington Insulation Co. Ltd., THE TMEs, 22 December 1983 (Chancery Div.)
(striking down as invalid an agreement in which one party agreed in advance to pay the costs
of the arbitration). These laws have not been applied, nor should they be applied, to agree-
ments on costs and fees which promote cost-effective dispute resolution. See Uff, at 156;
O'REILLY, supra note 68, § 1.5, at 5. Because the rules set forth in the model will create a
more equitable and efficient dispute resolution process and do not effectively discourage a
party from acquiring legal representation, an agreement by the parties adopting the model
should not violate such laws.
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The model also would not prevent arbitral decisions awarding costs
and attorneys' fees from being enforced by state parties to the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the New York Convention). 149 Under the New York Convention, which
has been adopted by over 100 countries, arbitral awards rendered in sig-
natory countries are enforceable in all other signatory countries, subject
to a narrow list of defenses.150 The most relevant exception is that an
award need not be enforced if it "would be contrary to the public policy
of that country. ' .. In general, however, these public policy exceptions
are minimal and a domestic law prohibiting awards of costs or fees
would not justify the nonrecognition of the award.'52 For example,
United States courts have generally enforced foreign arbitral awards of
costs and attorneys' fees despite adhering to the American rule in do-
mestic cases."'
149. New York Convention, supra note 131. For discussions of the New York Conven-
tion, see ALBERT VAN DEN BERG, TIE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981); Peter D.
Trooboff & Corinne A. Goldstein, Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1958 New York Conven-
tion: Experience to Date in U.S. Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 469 (1977); Robert B. von
Mehren, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under Conventions and United States Law, 9
YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 343 (1983).
150. New York Convention, supra note 131, at art. V.
151. Id. at art. V(2)(b). The scope of the New York Convention's public policy excep-
tion is unclear. Some countries believe it applies to national public policy. Others, such as
France, Lebanon and Italy, believe that it applies to international public policy. Unlike do-
mestic public policy, which includes all of the imperative rules of the State in which
enforcement is sought, international public policy encompasses only those basic notions of
morality and justice accepted by civilized countries. See Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or
Truly International) Public Policy, in COMPARATIvE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 257-318 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1986); Mark A. Buchanan, Public
Policy and International Commercial Arbitration, 26 Am. Bus. L.J. 511, 513-31 (1988); see
also Robert A.J. Barry, Application of the Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention: A Modest Proposal, 51 ThMP.
L.Q. 832 (1978); Jay R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy
Checks on U.S. and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of Control?, 65 TtiL. L. REv. 1661
(1991).
152. See BORN, supra note 84, at 627 ("The 'American rule' does not rise to the level of
U.S. public policy .. " The author further notes that a U.S. court asked to recognize an
award of costs and attorneys' fees under the New York Convention should do so.).
153. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-0169
(JGP), 1991 WL 122712, at *1-*9 (D.D.C. May 29, 1992) (confirming and enforcing an ICC
award, which included $993,220.60 for normal legal costs and $145,441.78 for arbitration
costs); see also Employers Ins. Wausau v. Banco Seguros del Estado, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1115,
1118-22 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (confirming under the Inter-American Convention on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration an award that included $930,730 in attorneys' fees and costs).
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B. Default Rules
In the absence of an agreement by the parties on the awarding of
costs and fees, either directly or by reference to arbitral rules, the model
sets forth a framework under which the tribunal may evaluate claims for
costs and fees. The framework would also apply when the parties'
agreement or the applicable arbitral rules fail to address any of the mat-
ters in the model. In such a case, the provisions of the model would
operate as a set of default rules, unless they are excluded by or are oth-
erwise inconsistent with a provision of the parties' agreement or the
arbitral rules selected by the parties.
1. Authorizing the Tribunal to Award Costs and Fees
The model makes clear that, in the absence of an agreement by the
parties, the arbitral tribunal has the power to allocate costs and fees. To
a large extent, arbitrators already have such authority. The most widely
used arbitral rules provide arbitrators with the authority to award costs
and fees, either through specific guidelines or through the grant of broad
discretion. 5 4 As a result, in most cases a tribunal will possess the power
to issue such an award.'55 In addition, statutes in many countries author-
ize arbitrators to award costs and fees. 56 Moreover, even where there is
no explicit authority, some courts have held that arbitrators have the im-
plied power to do so.' 5' As noted, however, some courts have held that
arbitrators lack the authority to award costs and fees, and in particular
attorneys' fees, unless the agreement of the parties explicitly provides
them with the authority to do so."' Thus, the model is needed to ensure
an arbitral tribunal's ability to award costs and fees.
154. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana (Ad Hoc-UNCOTRAL Oct. 27,
1989), reprinted in 19 YB. CoM. AR. 11, 30-32 (1994) (applying UNCITRAL Rules and
ordering respondent to pay $84,781.14 for fees and costs); Final Award No. 6829 (ICC
1992), reprinted in 19 Y.B. CoM. AR. 167, 183 (1994) (applying art. 20 of the 1988 ICC
Rules (permitting allocation and award of costs) and ordering respondent to pay the fees and
costs of arbitration).
156. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
157. See Painewebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2nd Cir. 1996); MCT Shipping
Corp. v. Sabet, 497 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); J.R. Snyder Co. v. Soble, 226 N.W.2d
276 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Commercial Metals Co. v. International Union Marine Corp.,
1973 A.M.C. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis of New Eng., Inc., 401
N.E.2d 839 (Mass. 1980) (ruling that, in order for an arbitrator to have the authority to award
costs and fees, the agreement must expressly grant the tribunal the power to do so).
158. See supra notes 56-57.
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2. Allocating Costs and Fees
The model provides a framework for allocating costs and fees. It
first states that the tribunal should require the losing party to pay the
"costs of the arbitration," which include the attorneys' fees of the pre-
vailing party. However, the model gives the tribunal the flexibility to
deviate from this principle. The tribunal can either: (1) apportion the
costs of the arbitration "between the parties if it determines that appor-
tionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the
case," or (2) "otherwise depart from [the model] for special reasons."
a. Presuming that the Unsuccessful Party Will Bear
the Costs of the Arbitration
The model adopts a presumption in favor of the losing party reim-
bursing the prevailing party for its costs and fees. Accordingly, it would
bring the awarding of costs and fees in arbitration in accord with the
practice followed by most countries with respect to allocation of litiga-
tion costs. In addition, it would further the goals of fully compensating
injured parties and deterring parties from pursuing nonmeritorius claims.
It would also bring uniformity and predictability to allocating costs and
fees in international arbitrations.
As noted in section I, the principle that costs follow the event is al-
most universally recognized. 9 Indeed, it is so well-accepted that it may
be viewed as a general principle of international law.' 6° Thus, the
model's adoption of the costs follow the event principle in arbitration
simply codifies the prevailing practice in the international arena.161
159. See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text.
160. Comparative law is a fundamental source of general principles of international
law. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Use of General Principles of International Law in International
Long-Term Contracts, 27 INT'L Bus. LAW. 214, 216-20 (1999). To identify a general princi-
ple, it is necessary to establish that national laws converge on the issue, here the awarding of
costs and attorneys' fees. This convergence suggests that the rule or practice may qualify.
While convergence is necessary, unanimous support is not required. Id. at 216; see Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View, 6 ARB. INT'L 133, 146 (1990) (stating
"lex mercatoria does not depend on proof of universality"). In the case of costs and attor-
neys' fees, since an overwhelming majority of countries award costs and fees to the
prevailing party, this convergence suggests that this practice constitutes a general principle
of international law. See id. at 146. As such, the model allocates costs and fees in a manner
consistent with this generally accepted principle.
It should also be noted that some commentators have argued that arbitrators may choose
to apply general principles of law in the absence of any choice of law agreement by the par-
ties. See Gaillard, supra, at 219-20. This practice may be extended to situations where the
agreement leads to ambiguity as to whether the parties intended the arbitrator to have
authority to award attorneys' fees.
161. This provision of the model is also consistent with the LCIA Rules, supra note 88,
at art. 28.4. The UNCITRAL Rules also state that the costs of the arbitration, except for the
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Awarding costs and fees to the prevailing party additionally indem-
nifies the winning party and deters claims with little merit and vexatious
actions. 162 The Swedish Procedural Law Commission explained:
The purpose of the litigation to provide legal protection would
be achieved only in incomplete measure unless the winning
party also obtained compensation of the costs incurred in en-
forcing [its] rights. And the knowledge that the losing party
generally must bear both [its] own costs and those of the other
party is destined to make the parties abstain from unnecessary
litigation. 163
The proposition that the principle deters parties from pursuing weak
claims is supported by an empirical study of litigation and settlement
under the English and American rules. 14 According to the study, a rule
requiring unsuccessful claimants to reimburse respondents for their costs
and fees caused claimants to anticipate higher legal expenditures. In
turn, this anticipation raised the "expected value threshold below which
they will not file their claims.', 165 Because claimants expect higher legal
costs, the study determined, they refrained from filing speculative
claims. This increased the relative frequencies of higher-probability and
high-award claims. 66 Accordingly, the principle of costs follow the
costs of legal representation, shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party.
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 88, at arts. 38, 40. Thus, there is no presumption in the
UNCITRAL rules that legal costs be borne by the unsuccessful party. Instead, the
UNCITRAL Rules state "tribunal shall be free to determine which party shall bear such costs
or may apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is rea-
sonable." Id. at art. 40(2). Unlike the UNCITRAL Rules, the model contains a presumption
that the losing party would bear the legal costs of the prevailing party. As more fully ex-
plained above, this would provide a more uniform and predictable approach for awarding
legal costs. Furthermore, the model gives the tribunal the flexibility to depart from costs
follow the event when the circumstances warrant deviating from the general principle. See
infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
162. See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 37, 42 (1984).
163. Procedural Law Commission, 231 (Swed.), reprinted in pertinent part in Wetter &
Priem, supra note 15, at 330.
164. See James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the
English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 225 (1995) [hereinafter
Empirical Study of English & American Rules]; see also James W. Hughes & Edward A.
Snyder, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990).
165. See Empirical Study of English & American Rules, supra note 164, at 230.
166. See Empirical Study of English & American Rules, supra note 164, at 248-49. But
cf A. Michael Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-
Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 519, 519 (1998) (concluding
through an economic study that when "a standard asymmetric-information model of litiga-
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event encourages claimants "to proceed more cautiously and to proceed
only with higher-quality claims." 6 '
To be sure, the principle that costs follow the event is no panacea.
Economic literature and empirical studies of the principle that costs
follow the event and the American rule indicate that, in theory, the for-
mer is more likely to increase the costs of resolving the dispute.6 ' In
addition, some commentators, such as Judge Richard Posner and Profes-
sor Steven Shavell, have argued that costs follow the event reduces the
likelihood of settlement. ,69
In theory, the principle that costs follow the event causes parties to
increase their legal expenditures. It
encourages litigants to spend more in cases that they do bring,
because the stakes of the lawsuit are higher when costs of legal
services are included in the award, and because each litigant will
tion [is used], . . the English rule results in more low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs
going to trial than under the American rule").
167. Empirical Study of English & American Rules, supra note 164, at 244.
168. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Le-
gal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989); Avery Katz, Measuring the
Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 143
(1987); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15
RAND J. EcON. 404 (1984); Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative
Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & Cor. PRoBs. 173 (1984); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225
(1982); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcON. 61 (1971);
Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L.
REv. 26 (1969).
169. RicHAR A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.10, at 629 (5th ed. 1998);
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Meth-
ods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 65 (1982).
Some commentators have argued that costs follow the event reduces the overall stock of
legal precedents. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Poser, Legal Precedent: A Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). This criticism of costs follow the
event is less of a concern in international commercial arbitrations because tribunal awards in
international arbitrations typically are private and not subject to public scrutiny, see BORN,
supra note 84, at 94, and arbitral tribunals generally are not bound by decisions of other
tribunals. Id.; see MBOR VkRADY E.T AL., supra note 5, at 61-82 (discussing the sources of
relevant norms in international arbitrations).
It also has been asserted that costs follow the event discourages indigent parties from
filing claims, see supra text accompanying note 43. This also may be less of a concern in
international commercial arbitrations where agreements between parties located in different
countries often involve substantial sums of money and sophisticated business entities that are
represented by counsel. See WLLIAM F. Fox, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREE-
MENTs: A PRIMER ON DRAFTING NEGOTIATING AND RESOLVING DISPUTES 14 (2d ed. 1992);
CRAIG ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 1.03-.05, at 6-10. Moreover, as more fully explained infra,
the model's "special reasons" exception may be used by tribunals to prevent undue hardship
on indigent parties, thereby reducing the possibility that costs follow the event will be unfair
to indigent parties.
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discount the expected marginal costs of legal services by the
probability that he or she will prevail.17
0
In practice, however, the principle should not result in significantly
higher legal expenditures than under the current system. The current
system leaves the parties in an uncertain state as to whether the arbitral
tribunal will apply the principle of costs follow the event and, because
most countries follow that principle, it is likely that parties in interna-
tional arbitrations already operate under the assumption that it will
apply. The model thus will not likely change most parties' expectations.
Moreover, the model limits excessive legal costs by requiring that reim-
bursable costs be "reasonable" in amount.'
7
1
Whether the principle that costs follow the event leads to fewer set-
tlements than under the American rule has been the subject of much
academic debate, and there appears to be no definitive answer to this
question. 7 2 However, it is clear that parties are more likely to settle dis-
putes under the model than under the current system. Because the
current system leaves parties without any guidance as to whether the
170. Clinton F. Becker III & Avery Katz, The Incentive effects of Litigation Fee Shifting
When Legal Standards are Uncertain, 15 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 205, 206 (1995). Professors
James Hughes and Edward Synder add:
[Under the English rule,] [I]itigants expect, with some positive probability, that
their legal fees will be paid by their rival. The higher the litigant's subject prob-
ability of winning at trial, the lower is the party's expected marginal cost of
potentially compensable expenditures. The English rule also increases the stakes -
the difference between winning and losing - in litigated cases by the amount of
legal costs subject to the fee-shifting rule. The greater stakes encourage efforts to
influence the trial's outcome.
Hughes & Snyder, supra note 164, at 227.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 192-201 discussing allowable costs. It is im-
portant to note that the study conducted by Professors Hughes & Snyder found that higher
legal costs resulting from the use of costs follow the event "[did not] disadvantage plaintiffs
at trial, causing them to win fewer cases and receive smaller judgments." Hughes & Snyder,
supra note 164, at 244.
172. Compare POSNER, supra note 169, at 629 (contending that the English rule makes
litigation, not settlement, more likely than the alternative of bearing one's own costs) and
Shavell, supra note 169, at 65-66 (arguing that, once a plaintiff has brought suit, settlement
is less likely under the English system than under the American system) and Gary M.
Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach, 71 REv.
EcON. & STAT. 189, 193 (1989) (finding that the English rule leads to lower rate of settle-
ment) with Don L. Course & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the
Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 161, 170-
71 (1988) (finding that the rate of settlement under the English rule is higher than under the
American rule). See also John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and
Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1093, 1119
(1991) (finding that applying the Coase theorem to the Posner/Shavell model "reveal[s] that
the parties should make the same decision regarding settlement whether they live in a juris-
diction that adheres to the British rule or one that follows the American rule").
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tribunal will award costs and fees, parties are often unable to predict
with any degree of certainty the outcome of a claim for costs and fees.
This lack of predictability ultimately impairs the ability of the parties to
fully evaluate the case and consequently settle the dispute. By con-
trast, the model provides parties with a uniform and predictable
approach that in most cases costs would follow the event. As a result,
parties would be able to more accurately assess their total monetary
claim or exposure, which will facilitate settlements.
b. Apportioning Costs and Fees Between the Parties
The model gives the tribunal the discretion to apportion the costs
and fees between the parties if it determines that it is reasonable to do
so. This provides the tribunal with the flexibility to depart from a strict
application of costs follow the event when the circumstances warrant
apportionment.
The model does not set forth the situations that justify apportioning
costs and fees between the parties nor mandate that the tribunal follow a
specific method for doing so. The circumstances that may justify appor-
tioning costs and fees between the parties vary according to the
particular facts of the case. The separate opinion in Sylvania Technical
Sys. v. Iran 1 4 elucidated some circumstances in which it may be appro-
priate for a tribunal to apportion costs:
[W]hen one party wins a claim and another wins a counterclaim,
apportionment is warranted. Similarly, some cases involve quite
separate and independent causes of action, such as where a con-
tractor claims under two separate contracts involving different
building projects. If such a claimant were to be successful as to
one project but lose as to the other, an apportionment of its total
legal fees would be appropriate.
1 7
1
173. One commentator explained:
[I]t must be a prerequisite to any international arbitration that the parties know
well in advance what to budget for costs, and that the cost system of the adminis-
tering institution is fully transparent from the outset, so that clients and their
counsel know how their money will be spent, and if they can expect to recoup it
fully or in part. Furthermore, a party should be in a position to reasonably predict
the level of financial risk that it will incur in an arbitration, and the conditions it
needs to satisfy to make a good claim for costs .... Knowing the mechanisms of a
given arbitration cost system, and the impact of its application ... may ... help a
party decide in a particular case whether it should file counterclaims, advance the
arbitration costs in lieu of the other party, or simply discontinue the proceedings.
BUhler, supra note 91, at 117-19.
174. 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298, 333 (1985) (Holtzmann, J., separate opinion).
175. Id.
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There are numerous ways for tribunals to apportion costs and fees
between the parties. 7 6 As noted, tribunals often apportion costs based on
the parties' level of success on their claims. For example, if claimant
wins 80% of its claims, some tribunals will require respondent to pay its
own costs and fees and 80% of claimant's costs and fees.'77
By contrast, when a party prevails only partially some other tribu-
nals will offset the reimbursement claims. To illustrate, assume that
claimant has prevailed on 80% of its claims. Thus, claimant was unsuc-
cessful on 20% of its claims. To determine the award of costs and fees,
the tribunal would offset the portion by which claimant was successful
by the portion that respondent prevailed, and, as a result, claimant would
be entitled to be reimbursed for 60% of its costs and fees. Respondent
would also be required to bear its own costs and fees.
This apportionment method is also known as the Welamson doc-
trine, named after its principle advocate, Professor Lars Welamson. 78
The Welamson doctrine appears to be the more theoretically sound ap-
proach and has been applied in many countries in both arbitration and
'.• 79
civil litigation. It is designed to allocate costs inter partes in propor-
tion to the success of the parties. It also encourages both parties to make
their claims as realistic as possible and thus facilitates settlements. 
80
176. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Final Award No. 5759 (ICC 1989), reprinted in 18 YB. CoM. AR. 34,
42-43 (1993) (holding that because claimant prevailed on 75% of the claims it raised in the
arbitration, it was entitled to have 75% of its arbitration costs paid by respondent).
178. Lars Welamson, Principer om rattegangskostnader under debatt, FESTSKRIFr TILL
OLIVECRONA 684-709 (1964).
179. See Hahnkamper, supra note 25, at AUS-107 (providing that where a party pre-
vails only partially, the reimbursement claims are offset by the percentage that the party was
not successful); NeustupnA, supra note 25, at CZK-88 (stating that courts allocate costs of
litigation according to the principle of success in the action); see also RICHARD H. KREIN-
DLER, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: A BAsIC PRIMER 294 (1997).
180. Professor Welamson believed that a system that awarded claimant a percentage of
costs and fees based solely on the extent to which it prevailed (without offsetting it by the
percentage by which it was unsuccessful) unduly favored claimant. Under Welamson's view,
a claimant who prevails on only 20% of its claims should not receive 20% its fees because it
lost 80% of its claims. J. Gillis Wetter and Charl Priem explained the background and theory
of the Welamson doctrine as follows:
Professor Welamson started with the proposition that strict liability for costs was a
principle which was inspired by the desire to afford the creditor/plaintiff full legal
protection of his legitimate claims; no person should be made to suffer from the
failure of another person to discharge his lawful obligations. However, before liti-
gation is instituted, one party (the plaintiff/creditor) claims a certain amount from
another (the defendant/debtor) who is prepared to pay only a lesser amount. Both
parties are then in an equal position in the sense that litigation is equally necessary
for the protection of both parties' rights if they cannot settle voluntarily. On that
basis .... it would be impossible to justify preferential treatment as to the alloca-
tion of costs of the plaintiff/creditor unless one maintained either that it was more
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To apply the Welamson doctrine, the tribunal determines the
"reimbursement claim," which is the percentage derived from dividing
the monetary award by the monetary sum originally sought by claimant.
This percentage equals the amount by which claimant is deemed to have
prevailed in the dispute. The tribunal next must determine the claimant's
"reimbursement obligation," if any, which is the percentage of the dis-
pute for which claim did not prevail. To determine the amount of costs
and fees that the losing party must pay to the prevailing party, the tribu-
nal offsets the reimbursement claim by the reimbursement obligation
and multiplies the final percentage by the amount of costs and fees
sought. The unsuccessful party is also responsible for 100% of its own181 . • 182
expenses.' The following three examples illustrate this doctrine.
important that a creditor obtained all that was due to him then that a debtor did not
have to pay too much or that a creditor had a weaker position in settlement nego-
tiations which should be compensated if litigation ensued. Both lines of reasoning
were rejected as untenable, on the ground that the allocation of costs doctrines
which were criticized essentially meant that lesser demands were made upon the
creditor in assessing whether his claim for compensation was reasonable than
upon his adversary in assessing whether the latter's offer of compensation was
reasonable.... [T]he principle of strict liability for costs would dictate that each
party be made to bear the consequences of his determination as to quantum in the
claim ....
Wetter & Priem, supra note 15, at 273-74.
181. The Welamson doctrine also can be stated in terms of a mathematical formula:
x-(1 -x)=y
If y > 0, then yw determines the costs and fees that respondent owes claimant.
If y = 0, then each party bears their own costs and fees.
If y < 0, then -I yv determines the costs and fees that claimant owes respondent.
Definitions:
x = percentage by which claimant is deemed by the tribunal to have prevailed in the
dispute.
y = reimbursement obligation (If y is greater than zero, then y is the reimbursement
obligation of respondent. If y is less than zero, then y must be multiplied by -1 to determine
the reimbursement obligation of claimant.)
w = claimant's costs and fees.
v = respondent's costs and fees.
182. The following is a graphical representation of the Welamson doctrine:
PERCENTAGE THAT PERCENTAGE THAT PERCENTAGE OF COSTS AND
CLAIMANT PREVAILS RESPONDENT FEES CLAIMANT
PREVAILS RECOVERS/OWES
100% 0% Claimant Recovers 100%
75% 25% Claimant Recovers 50%
50% 50% Claimant Recovers 0;
Parties Bear Their Own Costs
and Fees
25% 75% Claimant Owes Respondent 50%
of Respondent's Costs and Fees
0% 100% Claimant Owes Respondent
100% of Respondent's
Costs and Fees
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Case 1. Assume that claimant seeks $100,000 in a breach of con-
tract action and the tribunal awards it $100,000 in damages. Because
claimant prevailed entirely, its reimbursement claim is 100% and its
reimbursement obligation is 0. Accordingly, respondent must pay all of
claimant's costs and fees. Conversely, if the tribunal had awarded
claimant nothing, claimant would have been responsible for all of the
respondent's costs and fees.
Case 2. Assume that claimant seeks $100,000 in a breach of con-
tract action and the tribunal awards claimant $50,000 in damages. In this
case, the reimbursement claim is 50% and that claim is offset by its re-
imbursement obligation of 50%. As a result, the claimant is not entitled
to be reimbursed for its costs and fees; each party bears its own costs.
Case 3. Assume the amount in dispute is $100,000 and claimant is
awarded $70,000. Here, claimant receives 40% of its costs and fees,
which is equal to the difference between the reimbursement claim of
70% and the reimbursement obligation of 30%."3
While the Welamson doctrine, in theory, provides tribunals with a
logical method to allocate costs and fees where a party is partially suc-
cessful and results in a fair distribution of expenditures between the
parties, the model can be extremely difficult to apply. It appears to work
well in simple cases containing a single claim for damages. However,
applying the doctrine becomes difficult in complicated cases dealing
with multiple claims and counterclaims, as well as cases involving both
claims for damages and equitable relief. s4 In fact, commentators have
pointed out that in complex cases the doctrine can become so unwieldy
that it may be necessary to develop computer models to allocate costs
and fees correctly.' 5 Therefore, the difficulty in applying the Welamson
doctrine limits its utility.
Despite the doctrine's shortcomings, its main proposition-that
costs and fees should be allocated on a sliding scale proportionate to the
assessment by the tribunal of the claims made by the parties-arguably
Lars Welamson, Svensk ritspraxis: Civil-och straffprocessratt 1980-1987, 74 SVENSK
JURISTTIDNING 497, 531 (1989).
183. In the alternative, the amount owed to the claimant could be calculated by taking
70 percent of the claimant's costs and fees and subtracting 30 percent of the defendant's
costs and fees. This approach is possible if the tribunal knows the expenditures of both par-
ties. While an approach similar to this alternative is used to calculate damages in admiralty
cases, see also TaomAs J. SCHOENBAIrM, ADMIALTY & MARITIME LAw § 12-4, at 220-24 (2d
ed. 1994), requiring that all parties submit costs probably unduly complicates the resolution
of the claim for costs and fees and thus it has not been adopted by courts or tribunals. See
O'REmLy, supra note 68, at 53-54.
184. Welamson himself excluded cases in which the claim was predominately related to
liability and only partially to money damages. Wetter & Priem, supra note 15, at 273.
185. Id. at 275.
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should be the most important factor that a tribunal should consider in
deciding whether and how to apportion costs and fees between the par-
ties under the model. This would compensate parties for legal costs
expended to the extent that their claims were found to be justified by the
tribunal. It would also deter parties from asserting unrealistic claims,
facilitate settlements, and ultimately lead to a more efficient dispute
resolution system.
c. Departing from the Model for Special Reasons
The model gives the tribunal the flexibility to depart from its provi-
sions for awarding costs and fees for "special reasons." Special reasons
may include preventing undue hardship or punishing wrongful conduct.
In certain cases, tribunals may not desire to apply the model because
it will cause an indigent party undue hardship. Such a case may arise
when an individual does not possess significant financial resources and
must resort to international arbitration pursuant to the terms of its con-
tract with respondent to settle a dispute. This individual may not prevail
on his or her claim but nevertheless raise claims possessing an adequate
legal basis and involving unsettled questions of law.1
8
1
The special reasons exception also may be invoked when a party has
acted in bad faith or engaged in other misconduct. These are well-
recognized exceptions to the costs follow the event principle' 7 and are
illustrated by the following two ICC decisions.
186. Cf Empirical Study of English & American Rules, supra note 164, at 234 (noting
that when Florida adopted a mandatory fee-shifting rule for medical malpractice cases the
relevant statute relieved losing indigent parties of the obligation to pay the winner's fees);
Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Reconciling
Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 Thx. L. REv. 1863, 1868 n.27 (1988) (noting
that past tort reform efforts to adopt the English rule included provisions authorizing courts
to reduce or eliminate an award of attorneys' fees if doing so was necessary to "avoid undue
hardship").
187. See Final Award No. 4629 (ICC 1989), reprinted in 18 Y.B. COM ARB. 11, 33
(1993) (ordering respondent to pay 90% of the costs of the arbitration because its attitude
during the proceedings had delayed the resolution of the dispute); Final Award No. 7006
(ICC 1992), reprinted in 18 Y.B. CoM ARB. 58, 67 (1993) (requiring respondents to pay the
costs of the arbitration because they "unjustifiably denied liability" and refused to enter into
"discussions with claimant with a view to compensating it for its loss on some realistic ba-
sis"); Bonaire Trading, N.A., Ltd. v. Bessie Compania Naviera, S.A., Award No. 2226 (SMA
Sept. 30, 1985), reprinted in 12 YB. COM. ARB. 162, 164-65 (1987) (awarding costs to re-
spondent because of claimant's unreasonable conduct during the litigation); Case Numbers
213/215 (567-213/215-3) of 7 Nov. 1995 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.), reprinted in 22 YB. CoM.
ARB. 505, 529 (1997) (awarding additional costs to claimant because respondents had unnec-
essarily disrupted the arbitral process by asserting unfounded allegations).
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In Final Award No. 6527, an ICC panel held that the respondent had• • 188
wrongfully withdrawn from its contract with the claimant. Neverthe-
less, the panel denied the claimant's claim for costs and attorneys' fees
because it had requested excessive compensation.8 9
In Final Award No. 6248, an ICC panel denied claimant's conten-
tion that respondent breached its payment obligations under certain
consulting agreements, because the agreements were "offensive secret
commission agreement[s]" contrary to bonos mores and, therefore, null
and void under applicable law.' 90 The panel ruled that because the claim-
ant had failed entirely in its claim, it must bear the costs of the fees and
expenses of the arbitral tribunal and the administrative costs. However,
the panel required each party to bear its own legal costs, although nor-
mally the prevailing party would be entitled to compensation for
attorneys' fees. The panel concluded that "[i]t would not be fair and just
if the prevailing [party] which cooperated in the conclusion and per-
formance of the immoral agreements would be awarded its legal cost."' 9'
In short, the special reasons exception gives the tribunal the ability
to take into account unusual circumstances that justify deviations from
the model's framework. This will prevent injustices that may arise from
rigid application of the model and enable the tribunal to respond to
wrongful conduct.
3. Determining Allowable Costs and Fees
The model provides a list of costs and fees falling under the costs of
the arbitration that may be awarded by the tribunals. The costs and fees
for which a prevailing party may be entitled to reimbursement include:
(i) the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal;
(ii) any fees and expenses of the appointing authority;
188. See Final Award No. 6527 (ICC 1991), reprinted in 18 Y.B. COM. ARB. 44, 52
(1993).
189. See id. at 53.
190. See Final Award No. 6248 (ICC 1990), reprinted in 19 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 124, 125-
39 (1994).
191. Id.; see Award of 1982 (ICC), reprinted in 9 Y.B. COM. Aut. 105, 107-08 (1984)
(holding that where the parties deliberately concluded a fictitious contract, each was to pay
one half of the arbitration costs); Liberian Easter Timber Corp (LETCO) v. Liberia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/83/2 (Award of Mar. 31, 1986 and Rectification of May 14, 1986), reprinted
in 26 I.L.M. 647 (1987) (awarding LETCO costs and fees "based largely on Liberia's proce-
dural bad faith" (i.e., "fail[ing] to partake in these arbitral proceedings, contrary to its
contractual agreement," and instituting "judicial proceedings in Liberia in order to nullify the
results of this arbitration")).
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(iii) the costs of expert advice and of other assistance required
by the arbitral tribunal;
(iv) the travel and other expenses of witnesses; and
(v) the legal or other costs of the parties.
The model additionally mandates that the amount of the award of
costs and fees must be reasonable. This section of the model is designed
to provide a predictable method to determine reimbursable costs and
fees.
The model's list of allowable costs and fees is in conformity with
the general practice in international arbitration. It is well established that
the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal, any institutional fees and
other administrative costs, are expenditures that may be included in an
award of costs and fees.' 92 Similarly, tribunals often award to the pre-
vailing parties amounts spent on outside experts, travel, and witnesses.193
Tribunals also generally allow the costs of legal representation.' 94 These
192. See Final Award No. 1110, 21 Y.B. COM. ARB. at 53; Final Award No. 6829, 19
Y.B. COM. ARB. at 183; Final Award No. 6248, 19 YB. CoM. ARB. at 139; Amco Asia Corp.,
17 YB. COM. ARB. at 105; Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd., 17 YB. COM. ARB. at 142; see also RED-
FERN & HUNrER, supra note 6, at 406-07 (listing the costs normally included as costs of the
arbitral tribunal); ICC Rules, supra note 73, at art. 31 ("The costs of the arbitration shall
include the fees and expenses of the arbitrators and the ICC administrative costs fixed by the
Court, in accordance with the scale in force at the time of commencement of the arbitral
proceedings, as well as the fees and expenses of any experts appointed by the Arbitral Tribu-
nal and the reasonable legal and other costs incurred by the parties for the arbitration.")
(emphasis added); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 88, at art. 38 (stating that costs include,
inter alia, the fees of arbitral tribunal, travel, and other expenses of arbitrators).
193. See COB Shipping Canada, Inc. v. Trans Mktg. Houston, Inc., SMA No. 2935
(Dec. 30, 1992) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (awarding inter alia $13,167.72 for
expert witnesses and $3,067.75 for travel costs); Triumph Tankers Ltd. v. Kerr McGee Re-
fining Corp., Final Award No. 2642 (SMA Mar. 28, 1990), reprinted in 18 YB. CoM. ARB.
112, 120 (1993) (awarding inter alia $16,880 for expert fees); see REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 6, at 407 (listing other professional fees that are commonly awarded).
194. See BORN, supra note 84, at 626. It should be noted that, while awarding of the
costs listed above is relatively uncontroversial, arbitral tribunals have differed over whether
the costs of a party's own in-house counsel qualify as allowable costs. See Sun Refining &
Mktg. Co. v. Sheffield Trading Ltd., SMA No. 3173, 1008, 1014 (1995) (ruling that although
the SMA Rules allow awards of attorneys' fees, since the prevailing party's case was handled
by in-house counsel, no such fees would be allowed); Final Award No. 5759 (ICC 1989),
reprinted in 18 YB. CoM. ARB. 34, 43 (1993) (ruling that "Claimant's internal costs for man-
agement, employees, [and] travel ... cannot be qualified as arbitration costs"). The rationale
for refusing to award the prevailing party costs of in-house counsel is that they are salaried
employees who are compensated out of the company's profits and will be paid regardless of
whether they have worked on the arbitration. See Derin Shipping & Trading Ltd. v. Delphi
Petroleum, SMA No. 3064 (Nov. 10, 1993) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File). This
view seems incorrect. As one commentator pointed out, "[l]ogically, it is hard to distinguish
between the costs of outside counsel and inside counsel." Nurick, supra note 87, at 69. In
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costs include the fees of outside counsel and disbursements such as costs
of copies, telephone calls, faxes, and investigation.'"
By requiring that the costs of the arbitration be reasonable, the
model limits excessive claims for costs and fees. In general, the costs
must be incurred in activities that are normal and necessary for the arbi-
tration. 96 Judge Holtzmann adeptly explained the test of reasonableness
as follows:
addition, if a claimant uses an in-house lawyer instead of outside counsel to pursue legiti-
mate claims before an arbitral tribunal, valuable company resources have been expended (the
time of the in-house lawyer) that could have been used on other company business but for
the wrongful conduct of the other party. It thus should be entitled to be reimbursed for costs
of the in-house lawyer, provided that costs and fees claimed can be identified and evidenced.
See O'REILLY, supra note 68, § 5.10.3, at 73; Schwartz, supra note 8, at 21 n.50; see also In
re Eastwood, decd., 1975 Ch. 112 (Eng. C.A.) (awarding successful party costs of in-house
lawyers).
195. See Asia N. Am. Eastbound Rate Agreement v. Sun Lee, Inc., SMA No. 2932 (Jan.
6, 1993) (LEXIS, Admrty Library, Usawds File) (ordering respondent to pay the fees and
disbursements of claimant's outside counsel and the fees of two judges who submitted expert
witness affidavits); COB Shipping Canada, Inc., SMA No. 2935 (awarding $131,391.80 for
legal costs, which included attorneys' fees ($93,000), transcript fees ($6,183.75), expert
witness fees ($13,167.72), costs of copies, phone calls, faxes and investigation ($15,972.58),
and travel costs ($3,067.75)); Triumph Tankers Ltd., 18 YB. CoM. ARB. at 120 (awarding the
prevailing party $111,544.55 for legal fees and disbursements of counsel); Final Award No.
4975, 14 Y.B. COM. AiR. at 136 (denying claimants' claims, awarding respondents damages
on their counterclaims and ordering claimants to pay UK £500,000 for respondents' legal
costs and expenses and the cost of experts). See also ICC Rules, supra note 73, at art. 31
(stating that the costs of the arbitration include, among other things, "the fees and expenses
of any experts appointed by the Arbitral Tribunal and the reasonable legal and other costs
incurred by the parties for the arbitration"); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 88, at art. 38
(providing, inter alia, that costs include "the costs of expert advice and of other assistance
required by the arbitrators ... [and] [t]he costs for legal representation and assistance of the
successful party if such costs were claimed during the arbitral proceedings, and only to the
extent that the arbitral tribunal determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable");
REDERN & HUNTER, supra note 6, at 407 ("The costs of the parties include not only the fees
and expenses of the lawyers engaged to represent the parties in the arbitral proceedings, but
also money spent in the preparation and presentation of the case.").
196. See Final Award No. 6752, reprinted in 18 Y.B. COM. ARB. 54, 57 (1993) (ordering
respondent "to pay a fair part of the fees of claimant's counsel"); Final Award No. 6998,
reprinted in 21 Y.B. COM. AR B. 54, 77-78 (1996) (stating the general principle that prevail-
ing parties "are entitled to be fully compensated for all normal costs incurred by them in this
arbitration"); Sylvania Technical Sys., Inc., 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298, 323 (1985)
(stating that the Claims Tribunal has the authority to fix the legal costs of the successful
party "'only to the extent' that it deems them reasonable"); see also ICC Arb. Rules, supra
note 73, at art. 31 (stating that the costs of the arbitration include, among other things,
"reasonable legal and other costs incurred by the parties for the arbitration"); UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, supra note 88, at art. 38 (providing, inter alia, that costs include "[t]he
costs for legal representation and assistance of the successful party if such costs were
claimed during the arbitral proceedings, and only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal de-
termines that the amount of such costs is reasonable").
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A test of reasonableness is not.., an invitation to mere subjec-
tivity. Objective tests of reasonableness of lawyers' fees are well
known. Such tests typically assign weight primarily to the time
spent and complexity of the case. In modem practice, the
amount of time required to be spent is often a gauge of the ex-
tent of the complexities involved. Where the Tribunal is
presented with copies of bills for services, or other appropriate
evidence, indicating time spent, the hourly billing rate, and a
general description of the professional services rendered, its task
need be neither onerous nor mysterious. The range of typical
hourly billing rates is generally well known .... Just how much
time any lawyer reasonably needs to accomplish a task can be
measured by the number of issues involved in the case and the
amount of evidence requiring analysis and presentation. While
legal fees are not to be calculated on the basis of pounds of pa-
per involved, the Tribunal by the end of a case is able to have a
fair idea, on the basis of submissions made by both sides, of the
approximate extent of the effort that was reasonably required.' 9'
The party seeking an award of costs and fees must provide sufficient
proof to substantiate its claim. The tribunal's decision in Final Award
No. 6962 illustrates this requirement. 99 There, the prevailing claimant
submitted a statement of legal costs accompanied by its attorneys' offi-
cial fee schedule in support of its claim for attorneys' fees and200
expenses. The tribunal awarded claimant its legal costs, noting that
197. Sylvania Technical Sys., Inc., 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298, 333 (1985). In the
United States, many courts determine the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees using the
lodestar figure, which is the number of hours reasonably spent on the matter multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. See generally 7 Am Ju . 2d Attorneys at Law § 306 (1997). After
determining the lodestar figure, the court may adjust it based on the following factors:
1) the time and labor required in a particular case; 2) the novelty and diffi-
culty of the questions involved; 3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly; 4) preclusion of other employment by undertaking a particular case; 5)
the customary fee in the relevant community for similar work; 6) whether the fee
was fixed or contingent; 7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circum-
stances; 8) the amount involved and results obtained; 9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys involved; 10) the undesirability of the case;
11) the nature and length of professional relationship with the client; and 12) fee
awards in similar cases.
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
198. See Final Award No. 8032 (ICC 1995), reprinted in 21 Y.B. Com. Arb. 113, 121
(1996) (denying award of costs and fees even though claimant prevailed because it failed to
support its claim with any evidence).
199. Final Award No. 6962 (ICC 1992), reprinted in 19 YB. COM. ARu. 184, 193
(1994).
200. See id. at 192-93.
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"[s]ince this statement results from the application of an official fee
schedule and is therefore representative of the amount of fees which the
claimant has, or will have, paid to its attorney, observing also that,
whenever the fee schedule offers any leeway, the solution retained is
objectively reasoned, it shall be held that such statement fits the concept
of 'normal legal costs incurred.' ,201
The model provides a predictable framework for tribunals to follow
and for parties to rely on in evaluating claims for costs and fees. The
model makes clear that agreements on costs and fees will be enforced
according to their terms. In the absence of such an agreement, the model
provides a straightforward approach for awarding costs and fees. It gives
the tribunal the power to award them, states that in principle they should
be borne by the unsuccessful party, and defines what costs and fees may
be awarded. It also provides the tribunal with the flexibility to apportion
costs and fees between the parties or otherwise depart from the model
when warranted by the circumstances of the case. The model thus gives
tribunals a workable method for resolving claims for costs and fees,
which ultimately should result in more uniform and predictable awards.
CONCLUSION
While the practice in most countries, except in the United States, is
for the losing party to bear the costs and fees of the prevailing party,
there is no consensus on what costs may be awarded to the prevailing
party and whether and how costs should be apportioned when a party
only partially prevails. Furthermore, there is no uniform approach for
deciding claims for costs and fees. Tribunals may resolve a claim for
costs and fees by applying one of a variety of laws, rules, or principles.
This has resulted in awards of costs and fees being arbitrary, inconsis-
tent, and difficult to predict.
The current problems associated with the awarding of costs and at-
torneys' fees could be resolved by adopting the proposed model. It
presumes that if the parties have entered into an agreement on the pay-
ment of costs and fees or if they have designated arbitral rules to govern
their dispute that address this issue, the tribunal will award costs and
fees accordingly. In the absence of either or in the presence of an am-
biguous agreement or arbitral rules, the international tribunal would
201. Id. at 193.
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follow the model's guidelines for resolving the claim for costs and fees.
The model states that the tribunal shall have the authority to award costs
and fees and that they shall in principle be borne by the losing party. It
also provides the tribunal with the ability to apportion costs and fees
based on the circumstances of the case, such as when a party prevails on
some but not all of its claims. Lastly, the model sets forth a list of al-
lowable costs and fees.
Because it is grounded in generally accepted principles, the model
would provide tribunals with a practical approach for awarding costs
and fees that maintains the flexibility necessary to account for the differ-
ences of individual cases and differing legal systems. If adopted, the
model will provide much needed uniformity and predictability to arbitral
awards of costs and fees, while also ensuring that similarly situated par-
ties are treated equally and fairly.
Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees
APPENDIX A
MODEL CLAUSE ON THE AWARDING OF COSTS AND FEES
(TO BE INSERTED INTO THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT)
Costs and Fees.
(1) Authority to Award Costs of the Arbitration. The arbitral tri-
bunal shall have the authority to make an award allocating the costs of
the arbitration between the parties.
(2) Allocating Costs of the Arbitration. The costs of the arbitra-
tion shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party. However, at
its discretion, the tribunal may (i) apportion such costs, in whole or in
part, between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reason-
able, taking into account the circumstances of the case, or (ii) otherwise
depart from this rule for special reasons.
(3) Defining Costs of the Arbitration. The costs of the arbitration
shall be reasonable in amount and shall include but not be limited to:
(a) the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal;
(b) any fees and expenses of the appointing authority;
(c) the costs of expert advice and of other assistance
required by the arbitral tribunal;
(d) the travel and other expenses of witnesses; and
(e) the legal or other costs of the parties.
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APPENDIX B
MODEL RULE ON THE AWARDING OF COSTS AND FEES
(TO BE INCORPORATED INTO A SET OF ARBITRAL RULES)
Costs and Fees.
(1) The parties shall be free to agree on rules regarding the costs of
the arbitration.
(2) Unless the agreement of the parties provides otherwise, these
rules apply:
(a) Authority to Award Costs of the Arbitration. The arbitral tri-
bunal shall have the authority to make an award allocating the costs of
the arbitration between the parties.
(b) Allocating Costs of the Arbitration. The costs of the arbitra-
tion shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party. However, at
its discretion, the tribunal may (i) apportion such costs, in whole or in
part, between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reason-
able, taking into account the circumstances of the case, or (ii) otherwise
depart from this rule for special reasons.
(c) Defining Costs of the Arbitration. The costs of the arbitration
shall be reasonable in amount and shall include but not be limited to:
(i) the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal;
(ii) any fees and expenses of the appointing authority;
(iii) the costs of expert advice and of other assistance
required by the arbitral tribunal;
(iv) the travel and other expenses of witnesses; and
(v) the legal or other costs of the parties.
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